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I. INTRODUCTION
Joan Piacquadio, at the time a 73-year-old widow, testified before the
Subcommittee on Social Security, Pensions, and Family Policy in 2007 about the
hardship that she had suffered by operation of the Windfall Elimination Provision
(WEP).' During her 50-year career as a registered nurse, Joan worked for 25 years
in her local public school system.2 While Joan's testimony does not provide precise
details, it is clear that some portion of her service for the public school system
constituted noncovered employment - employment for which Joan received
4earnings that were not subject to Social Security taxes. Unfortunately for Joan, an
employment record that reflected noncovered employment subjected her to
application of a controversial provision of the Social Security Act - the WEP.' By
operation of the WEP, Joan qualified for a Social Security benefit of $167 per
month ($2,004 per year) after a 50-year career.' Forced to work well into her elder
years to make ends meet, Joan only retired after her heart failed at age 73 and she
7
underwent a triple-bypass surgery.
Certain federal, state, and local government employees do not pay into the
Social Security system, but rather, pay into alternative government pension plans.
For purposes of the Social Security Act, where a worker pays into an alternative
government pension plan, the worker's employment constitutes noncovered
employment.9 Even if a worker's employment record reflects significant periods of
noncovered employment, the worker may still qualify for Social Security coverage
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including John Valery White, Timothy A. Canova, Michael Olivas, Kevin R. Johnson, Gail L. Richmond,
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1. Government Pension Offset (GPO) and Windfall Elimination Provision (WEP): Policies Affecting
Pensions from Work Not Covered by Social Security: Hearing Before Subcomm. On Soc. Sec., Pensions, and




4. 42 U.S.C. § 410(a)(7) (2008).
5. Hearing Before Subcomm. On Soc. Sec., Pensions, and Family Planning, supra note 1, at 49; 42
U.S.C. § 415(a)(7)(A) (2006).
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. 42 U.S.C. § 410(a)(5), (7).
9. Id.
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because she satisfies the minimum requirement of 10 years (40 quarters) of
earnings in Social Security covered employment.'o However, an employment record
that reflects both covered and noncovered employment presents a challenge to
equitable application of the Social Security Act. To determine the benefits to which
a worker is entitled, the Social Security Act first employs an averaging provision
that considers 35 years of covered employment." Where an individual's
employment record does not reflect 35 years of covered employment, the averaging
provision compresses the worker's average earnings.12 Effectively, a lifetime high-
income worker who held both covered and noncovered employment appears to be a
lifetime low-income worker by operation of the averaging provision." The second
step in determining a worker's Social Security benefits entails application of a
progressive benefits formula to the workers average earnings.14 By operation of the
averaging provision and the progressive benefit formula, a high-income worker
who held both covered and noncovered employment received a higher than
statutorily intended replacement rate (the ratio of benefits to average earnings) prior
to 1983." In an effort to downward-adjust Social Security benefits for workers who
held both covered and noncovered employment, Congress enacted the WEP in
1983.16
According to the Government Accountability Office, in 2007, the Social
Security system covered approximately 96 percent of the American workforce; the
remaining four percent of noncovered workers were predominantly public
employees. 7 The four percent of the American workforce that does not pay into the
Social Security system consists of approximately 6.8 million state and local
government workers, and half a million federal government workers. Thus, more
than seven million federal, state, and local government employees can potentially
be subject to the WEP, and the type of hardship, which Joan Piacquadio
experienced.
Reducing the Social Security benefits of over one million retired federal, state,
and local government employees," the WEP is an extremely controversial
component of the Social Security Act that has elicited a variety of criticisms from
scholars and opponents.2 For example, critics charge that the WEP, due to its
10. 42 U.S.C. § 414(a)(2) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 413(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(7)(D).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 415(b)(1)(A); 42 U.S.C. § 415(b)(2)(A)(i); 42 U.S.C. § 415(b)(2)(B)(i).
12. See discussion infra Part 2.D: Effect of Noncovered Employment Under the Social Security Benefits
Formula.
13. Id.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(1)(A).
15. See discussion infra Part 2.D: Effect of Noncovered Employment Under the Social Security Benefits
Formula.
16. See discussion infra Part 2.E: Towards Enactment of the WEP.
17. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-08-248T, SOCIAL SECURITY: ISSUES REGARDING THE
COVERAGE OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES: STATEMENT OF BARBARA D. BOVBJERG, DIRECTOR EDUCATION,
WORKFORCE, AND INCOME SECURITY 1 (2007).
18. Id.
19. U.S Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 17, at 4.
20. ALLISON M. SHELTON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-35, SOCIAL SECURITY: THE WINDFALL
ELIMINATION. PROVISION (WEP) 6 (2010); See Discussion infra Part 3: WEP: The Problems.
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21
regressive structure, disproportionately affects low-income workers. Another
problem surrounding the WEP involves the administrative challenge of enforcing
the provision, as a disparity presently exists in the degree to which the SSA
22enforces the WEP against federal retirees, as compared to state and local retirees.
Finally, SSA efforts to communicate with the public about the provision are
23
insufficient, resulting in public misperception and resentment, as well as
significant hardship when workers mistakenly fail to account for the provision's
effects.24
Recognizing the considerable problems underlying the WEP, legislators have
consistently sought to modify, replace, or repeal the WEP. During the previous
decade and a half, Senators and Representatives have introduced at least 35 bills
before Congress addressing the WEP. Suggestive of Congressional interest in
reliving public servants from the potential hardships stemming from the WEP, one
26
bill has received as many as 337 cosponsors in the House of Representatives.
Together, the bills represent four distinct legislative proposals: (1) the Social
Security Fairness Act, (2) the WEP Relief Act (2004 and later),2 (3) the WEP
Relief Act (pre-2004),29 and (4) the Public Servant Retirement Protection Act.
This Article begins in Part II by explaining the rationale behind the WEP. Part
II explains the policy underlying the Social Security system, the operation of the
Social Security benefits formula, the effect of noncovered employment, and the
operation of the WEP. Next, in Part III, this Article examines the WEP's underlying
problems, which include structural and administrative issues that disproportionately
21. Jeffery R. Brown & Scott Weisbenner, The Distributional Effects of the Social Security Windfall
Elimination Provision, THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 8-13 (Sept. 2008),
http://www.nber.org/programs/ag/rrc/08-05%20Brown%20OWeisbenner/2OFINAL.pdf (last visited Jan. 15,
2012).
22. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 17, at 4-7.
23. Brown & Weisbenner, supra note 21, at 19; ALLISON M. SHELTON, CONG. RESEARCH SERv., 98-35,
SOCIAL SECURITY: THE WINDFALL ELIMINATION PROVISION (WEP) 19 (2010).
24. Id. at 6.
25. H.R. 1332, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 2797, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 113, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 113,
112th Cong. (2011); S. 2010, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 235, 11Ith Cong. (2009); H.R. 1221, 111th Cong.
(2009); H.R. 2145, 11Ith Cong. (2009); S. 490, 11Ith Cong. (2009); S. 484, 11Ith Cong. (2009); H.R. 82,
110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 726, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 2772, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 206, 110th Cong.
(2007); S. 1647, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 147, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 1690, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R.
1714, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. Res. 987, 109 Cong. (2006); S. 619, 109th Cong. (2005); S. 866, 109th
Cong. (2005); H.R. 594, 108' Cong. (2003); H.R. 2011, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 2611, 108th Cong. (2003);
H.R. 4234, 108th Cong. (2004); H.R. 4391, 108th Cong. (2004); H.R. Res. 523, 108th Cong. (2004); S. 349,
108th Cong. (2003); S. 1011, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 2455, 108th Cong. (2004); H.R. 1073, 107th Cong.
(2001); H.R. 2638, 107th Cong. (2001); S. 1523, 107th Cong. (2001); S. 2521, 107th Cong. (2002); H.R. 860,
106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 2549, 105th Cong. (1997).
26. H.R. 82, 110th Cong. (2008).
27. H.R. 1332, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 2010, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 235, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 484,
11Ith Cong. (2009); H.R. 82, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 206, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 147, 109th Cong. (2005);
S. 619, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 594, 108" Cong. (2003); S. 349, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 2638, 107th
Cong. (2001); S. 1523, 107th Cong. (2001).
28. H.R. 2145, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 726, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1690, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R.
4234, 108th Cong. (2004).
29. H.R. 2011, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 1011, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 1073, 107th Cong. (2001); S.
2521, 107th Cong. (2002); H.R. 860, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 2549, 105th Cong. (1997).
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impact low-income workers. Moreover, Part III examines the public misperception
and resentment surrounding the WEP, and deficiencies in the Social Security
Administration's efforts to communicate the rational underlying the provision to the
public. Part IV considers the considerable legislative effort over the past decade and
a half to modify, replace, or repeal the WEP, providing an explanation and analysis
of each bill. Finally, building on the concepts developed in each of the previous
sections, Part V presents an alternative approach to eliminating the "'windfall"'
benefits that accrue to noncovered workers. The alternative approach balances the
fundamental tenants of the Social Security system - a progressive benefits structure
and the earned right nature of benefits. As such, the approach ensures equitable
benefits to noncovered workers.
II. THE SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS FORMULA AND THE WEP
A. Social Security: Purpose and Principles
In 1935, at the height of the Great Depression, Congress answered President
Roosevelt's call to protect the American workforce against the "hazards and
vicissitudes of life,"30 by enacting the Social Security Act of 1935 - an act
originally intended to raise the general welfare by providing federal old-age
benefits and by enabling the states to provide family aid and unemployment
compensation.31 Through subsequent amendment, the Social Security Act has
expanded, providing old-age, disability, and survivors' insurance to insured
workers, as well as their dependents - presently the Social Security system covers
approximately 96 percent of the American workforce.32 Although Congress
designed the system to extend protection to retiring workers and their families, the
Social Security benefits formula does not replace 100 percent of a worker's
preretirement income, but rather, provides a safety net by replacing a percentage of
preretirement income. Given the decision to only replace a percentage of
preretirement income, the system requires a progressive benefit structure - low-
income workers receive benefits representing a greater percentage of preretirement
income than their high-income counterparts - to provide, an adequate standard of
living for retiring low-income workers. 34 Thus, the Social Security system
redistributes income from high-income workers to workers with low lifetime
earnings, and even transfers income based on family structure and lifespan.3 s
Despite the progressivity of the Social Security benefits formula, a fundamental
principle of the Social Security system is that entitlement to benefits through the
30. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress Reviewing the Broad Objectives and
Accomplishment of the Administration (June 8, 1934).
31. H. R. REP. No. 615 (1935).
32. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 17, at 3-4.
33. Francine Lipman & James E. Williamson, Social Security Benefits 101, 53 ORANGE COUNTY LAW
30,31 (2011).
34. Id.
35. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 17, at 3.
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system represents an "'earned right."" As such, the benefits to which a retiring
worker is entitled reflect contributions, which the worker, and her employer, paid in
Social Security taxes."
B. Social Security: Eligibility Basics
Under Title II of the Social Security Act, a worker's eligibility for Social
Security benefits based on her own work record depends upon two
requirements. First, the worker must receive sufficient taxable earnings in
Social Security covered employment for 10 years (40 quarters)." Beginning
in 1978, the Social Security Administration (SSA) indexed the amount of
taxable earnings required for a quarter of coverage to wage growth;" in 2013,
the amount of taxable earnings required for a quarter of coverage is $1,160.40
Upon earning 40 credits for social security covered employment, the worker
becomes a fully insured individual;41 however, the worker is not eligible to
receive Social Security benefits until she attains retirement age.
Retirement age varies according to the date on which a worker attains
early retirement age and whether a worker elects to retire at early retirement
age, full retirement age, or a deferred retirement age. For the purposes of old-
age insurance benefits, early retirement age means age 62.42 A worker first
becomes eligible to receive Social Security benefits upon attaining early
retirement age;43 however, Title II provides for a reduction of a worker's
primary insurance amount (PIA) - the monthly benefit payable to the worker
at full retirement age - if a worker elects to receive Social Security benefits at
early retirement age.44 Specifically, a worker reaching early retirement age on
or before December 31, 2016 that elects to receive Social Security benefits
upon attaining early retirement age receives a 25 percent reduction in PIA
gradually increasing to a 30 percent reduction in PIA for workers attaining
early retirement age on or after January 1, 2022.45 For a worker attaining early
retirement age before January 1, 2017, full retirement age means age 66;46 by
36. Penalty for Public Service: Do the Social Security Government Pension Offset and Windfall
Elimination Provision Unfairly Discriminate Against Employees and Retirees?: Hearing Before the Senate
Committee on Governmental Affairs, 108th Cong. 13 (2003) [hereinafter Hearing: Penalty for Public Service]
(statement of Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security).
37. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 17, at 3.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 414(a)(2) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 413(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2006).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 413(d)(2).
40. Social Security Administration: Fact Sheet: 2013 Social Security Changes, available at
www.ssa.gov/pressoffice/factsheetscolafacts20l3.html; Cost-of-Living Increase and Other Determinations for
2012, 76 Fed. Reg. 66,111, 66,115 (Oct. 25, 2011) (setting forth 2012 limit of $1,130).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 414(a).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 416(l)(2) (2006).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 402(a)(2) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(3)(B) (2006).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 4 02(q)(1).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 402(q)(1), (9); 42 U.S.C. § 416(l)(1)(D).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 416(l)(1)(C); For workers attaining early retirement age on or after January 1, 2022, full
retirement age means age 67. 42 U.S.C. § 416(l)(1)(E). The statute provides for incremental increases in full
186 [Vol. 39:2
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definition, PIA is 100 percent for workers electing to receive Social Security
benefits at full retirement age. Finally, workers may elect to defer retirement
age to age 70 receiving annual deferred retirement credits to PIA of 8 percent
up to 132 percent of PIA.47
C. The Social Security Benefits Formula
The monthly benefit to which a worker is entitled upon attaining full retirement
age is the worker's PIA.4 8 The SSA determines a worker's PIA by first calculating
the workers average indexed monthly earnings (AIME). 49 For a worker attaining
age 21 after 1950, the formula for AIME considers the worker's annual earnings in
Social Security covered employment between the calendar year after which the
worker reaches age 21 and the calendar year in which the worker reaches early
retirement age.5 Title II then provides for wage indexing - based on the national
average wage index - of annual earnings for each covered year of employment to
account for wage growth during the period in consideration." From the 40 years of
wage indexed annual earnings in consideration, the formula for AIME disregards
annual earnings for the worker's five lowest-paid years of earnings.5 Thus, AIME
is concerned with a worker's 35 highest earning years in Social Security covered
employment. Finally, the SSA derives AIME by totaling annual earnings from the
worker's 35 highest-earning years, and dividing the sum by 420 - the number of
months in 35 years.
AIME = SalaryYeart + SalaryYear2. .+SalaryYear35
35 years*12 months (or 420 months)
retirement age for workers attaining early retirement age between January 1, 2016 and December 31, 2021. 42
U.S.C. § 416(l)(1)(D), (3)(B).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 402(w)(1), (2), (6)(D). (The 8 percent annual credit applies to individuals attaining early
retirement age in calendar years after 2004. The statute provides for alternative deferred retirement credits for
individuals attaining early retirement age on or before 2004.) 42 U.S.C. § 402(w)(6)(A)-(D). In determining
the deferred retirement credit to which an individual is entitled, the Social Security Act considers the number
of increment months for such individuals. Increment months include the number of elapsed months from the
month in which the individual reaches retirement age to the month before the month in which the individual
reaches age 70. 42 U.S.C. § 402(w)(2)(A), (B)(i)-(iii). If the individual reaches early retirement age before
January 1, 2017, then the individual will attain full retirement age at 66 years of age. 42 U.S.C. § 416(l)(1)(C).
Thus, for such an individual, the statute is concerned with up to 48 increment months. 42 U.S.C. §
402(w)(2)(A), (B)(i)-(iii). To determine the deferred retirement credit, the statute instructs the SSA to derive
the product an individual's total increment months multiplied by two-thirds of one percent (for an individual
reaching early retirement age after 2004. If the individual defers retirement until age 70, she will receive the
maximum deferred retirement credit - 132 percent of PIA (48 * ((2/3) * .01)). As noted above, for workers
attaining early retirement age after January 1, 2022, full retirement age means age 67. 42 U.S.C. §
416(l)(1)(E). Thus, for such an individual, the statue will consider a maximum of 36 increment months. 42
U.S.C. § 402(w)(2)(A), (B)(i)-(iii). If a worker reaches early retirement age after January 1, 2022, and defers
retirement until age 70, she will receive the maximum deferred retirement credit for such an individual - 124
percent of PIA (36 * ((2/3) * .01)).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(1)(A) (2006).
49. Id.
50. 42 U.S.C. § 415(b)(1)(A).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 415(b)(3)(A).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 415(b)(2)(A)(i), (b)(2)(B)(i).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 415(b)(1).
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Once the SSA has computed a worker's AIME, Title II requires the SSA to
apply a formula to AIME to derive the worker's PIA.54 The formula separates
AIME into three brackets, which are delineated by dollar amounts - the dollar
amounts separating each bracket are known colloquially as "bendpoints."" Title II
provides for wage indexing of the bendpoints, based on the national average wage
index, to insure that the PIA reflects increases in the standard of living for
successive generations of retirees. For a worker who first becomes eligible to
receive Social Security benefits in 2012 - that is, a worker who attains early
retirement age (62) in 2012 - the bendpoints are $767 and $4,624 ($791 and $4,768
in 2013).17 Thus, the brackets of AIME are as follows: the first bracket includes
AIME up to $767 (the first bendpoint); the second bracket includes AIME between
$768 and $4,624 (the second bendpoint); and the third bracket includes AIME from
$4,625 to the social security taxable earning ceiling. As with other elements of the
AIME and PIA equations, Title II provides for wage indexing of maximum taxable
earnings," resulting in a taxable earning ceiling of $110,100 in 2012 ($113,700 in
2013),9 and a maximum AIME of $8,199 ($8,539 in 2013)"o for a worker attaining
early retirement age in 2012.61 The formula for PIA applies a different percentage
54. 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(1)(A).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(1)(A)(i)-(iii), (a)(B)(i); Cost-of-Living Increase and Other Determinations for
2012, 76 Fed. Reg. 66,111, 66,115 (Oct. 25, 2011).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(B)(ii); Cost-of-Living Increase and Other Determinations for 2012, 76 Fed. Reg.
66,111, 66,115 (Oct. 25, 2011).
57. Cost-of-Living Increase and Other Determinations for 2012, 76 Fed. Reg. 66,111, 66,115 (Oct. 25,
2011).
58. 42 U.S.C. § 415(e)(1). The bendpoints for a covered worker who attains early retirement in 2013 are
$791 and $4,768. Social Security Administration, Primary Insurance Amount, available at
www.ssa.gov/OACT/COLA/piaformula.html.
59. Cost-of-Living Increase and Other Determinations for 2012, 76 Fed. Reg. 66,114, 66,115 (Oct. 25,
2011). The maximum taxable earnings ceiling for 2013 is $113,700. Social Security Administration: Fact
Sheet: 2013 Social Security Changes, available at www.ssa.gov/pressoffice/factsheetscolafacts2013.html.
60. The maximum AIME for a working retiring in 2013 is $8,539. Id.
61. For purposes of the Internal Revenue Code, maximum taxable earnings equals the Social Security
Act's contribution and benefit base. 26 U.S.C. § 3121(a)(1) (2006). Calculating the contribution and benefit
base under the Social Security Act is complex. For example, where a worker received earnings in Social
Security covered employment after 1981, the contribution and benefits base equals the product of $29,700 and
the quotient obtained by dividing the national average index for the calendar year preceding a year in which
the Commissioner of Social Security increases benefits due to a cost of live increase by the national average
wage index for the calendar year 1992. 42 U.S.C. § 430(c) (2006). The initial dollar value that the SSA
multiples by the above ratio varies based on the year in which a worker received earnings from employment.
42 U.S.C. § 430(b), (c). Given the calculation for the contribution and benefit base, maximum taxable
earnings vary from year to year, and have generally increased with inflation. See, Maximum Taxable Earnings
(1937 - 2012) SOCIAL SECURITY ONLINE, http://www.ssa.gov/planners/maxtax.htm (last visited Mar. 10,
2012) for a list of the dollar values representing maximum taxable earnings from 1937 to 2012. To determine
AIME for a worker who receives maximum taxable earnings during each of 35 years in covered employment,
the Social Security Act requires the SSA to multiply earnings in a given year by the quotient obtained by
dividing the national average wage index for the calendar year in which a worker attains 60 years of age by
the national average wage index for the year in which the worker received the earnings. 42 U.S.C. §
415(b)(3)(A)(i), (ii). If one performs this calculation for maximum taxable earnings from calendar years 1978
to 2012, and divides by 35 years of employment, one finds that the worker received average annual earnings
of $98,388. To avoid adding a layer of complexity, anytime this Article refers to maximum taxable earnings,
it will assume average annual wage indexed earnings of $98,388. Note that technically, the value for a worker
who earned maximum taxable earnings will be above or below this value in most calendar years.
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factor to each bracket of AIME: PIA includes 90 percent of the first bracket, 32
percent of the second bracket, and 15 percent of the third bracket.6 Where the
product of an AIME bracket multiplied by a percentage factor does not end in a
multiple of $0.10, Title II provides for rounding the product down to the nearest
multiple of $0.10. The sum of these amounts equals PIA.
PIA = 0.9*min(AIME, $767)+ 0.32*max(0,min(AIME, $4,624)-
$767)+0.15*max(0,AIME-54,624)
To illustrate application of the formulas for AIME and PIA, consider examples
of a hypothetical low-income worker, average-income worker, and high-income
worker. First, the low-income worker held Social Security covered employment for
35 years during which time she earned an average indexed annual wage of $9,000.
The low-income worker's AIME is $750 (($9,000 * 35 years) / 420).6 Attaining
early retirement age in 2012, the low-income worker has a PIA of $675 ($750 *
.9).66 By contrast, the middle-income worker, who also worked in Social Security
covered employment for 35 years, earned an average indexed wage of $45,000. As
such, the middle-income worker's AIME is $3,750 (($45,000 * 35 years) / 420)
and, if she attains early retirement age in 2012, her PIA is $1,644.80 (($767 *.9) +
(($3,750 - $767) * .32)." Finally, the high-income worker, who also held Social
Security covered employment for 35 years, but earned an average indexed annual
wage equal to the Social Security taxable earning ceiling of $98,388 has an
'AIME equals $8,199 (($98,388 * 35) / 420).70 If the high-income worker attains
early retirement age in 2012, his PIA will be the maximum PIA available to a
worker of his birth cohort - $2,460.70 (($767 *.9) + (($4,624 - $767) * .32) +
(($8,199 - $4,624) * .15).71
Application of Social Security benefits formula for a worker with AIME of $750
First Bracket of AIME $750 * .9 = $675
Total PIA $675
Application of Social Security benefits formula for a worker with AIME of $3,750
62. 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(1)(A)(i)-(iii).
63. 42 U.S.C. § 415(a).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 414(a)(1)(A) (2006).
65. 42 U.S.C. § 415(b).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 415(a).
67. 42 U.S.C. § 415(b).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 415(a).
69. See Discussion supra Footnote 61.
70. 42 U.S.C. § 415(b); see Social Security Benefit Amounts, SOCIAL SECURITY ONLINE,
http://www.ssa.gov/oact/COLA/Benefits.html (last visited Mar. 10, 2012) (providing that a worker who
received maximum taxable earnings over 35 years of covered employment has an AIME of $8,199 if she
reaches early retirement age in 2012. This confirms the discussion from Footnote 61 ($8,199 * 12= $98,388).
71. 42 U.S.C. § 415(a).
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First Bracket of AIME $767 * .9 = $690.3
Second Bracket of AIME $3,750 * .32 = $954.56
Total PIA $1,644.86 (rounded down to $1,644.80)
Application of Social Security benefits formula for a worker with AIME of $8,199
First Bracket of AIME $767 * .9 = $690.3
Second Bracket of AIME $3,857 * .32 = $1,234.24
Third Bracket of AIME $3,575 * .15 = $536.25
Total PIA $2,460.79 (rounded down to $2,460.70)
As demonstrated by the example of the high-income worker, a worker
receiving maximum taxable earnings in Social Security covered employment for 35
years will have a PIA of $2,460.70, or 30 percent of the worker's AIME, if she
reaches early retirement age in 2012. Comparing PIA as a percentage of AIME for
the high-income worker to the same figures for the average and low-income
workers provides an illustration of the progressivity of the Social Security benefits
formula - a consequence of the operation of the decreasing percentage factors
applicable to the increasing brackets of AIME. For example, the average-income
worker receives a PIA of $1,644.80 in the above example, and collects 44 percent
of his AIME. His counterpart, the low-income worker, receives a PIA of $675, or
90 percent of his AIME. Looking to the "cost/benefit advantage" accruing to the
middle and low-income worker, as compared to the high-income worker, similarly
illustrates the progressivity of the formula.7 In the above example, the high-income
worker receives a monthly benefit 50 percent larger than the middle-income worker
and 265 percent larger than the low-income worker; however, during her
employment, the high-income worker paid 119 percent more in Social Security
taxes than the middle-income worker, and 993 percent more than the low-income
worker."
Comparison of PIA, Replacement Rates, and Employee Contributions
Worker PIA Replacement Rate Employee
Contributions
High-Income $2,460.70 30 percent $213,502
Average-Income $1,644.80 44 percent $97,650
Low-Income $675 1 90 percent $19,530
72. Lipman & Williamson, supra note 39, at 10, 11 (2011).
73. Calculations are based on the present FICA employee tax rate of 6.2 percent, 26 U.S.C 3101(a);
($2,460.70 / $1,644.80)* 100 = 150 percent
($2,460.70 / $675) * 100 = 365 percent
((($98,388 * 35) *.062) / (($45,000 *35) * .062)) * 100 = 219 percent
((($98,388 * 35) *.062) / (($9,000 *35) * .062)) * 100= 1093 percent
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D. Effect of]Noncovered Employment under the Social Security Benefits Formula
The previous examples demonstrate application of the formulas for an
individual's AIME and PIA to workers with 35 years of Social Security covered
74
employment - a full employment record for purposes of the calculation for AIME.
However, some workers do not hold Social Security covered employment for 35
years, but rather, spend varying portions of their careers in noncovered
employment. The possibility of holding employment that is not covered by the
Social Security system is a consequence of the gradual process by which Congress
extended coverage to the American workforce. When Congress enacted the Social
Security Act in 1935, it extended coverage to most workers in commerce and
industry - approximately 60 percent of the workforce at the time. Congress did
not originally extend Social Security coverage to federal government employees
because they received pension benefits through the Civil Service Retirement
System.
The Social Security Amendments Act of 1983 extended mandatory Social
Security coverage to federal employees hired after December 31, 1983; however,
the Act did not extend Social Security coverage to federal employees who began
their employment prior to the effective date. Moreover, Title II of the Social
Security Act permits federal employees to elect coverage under the Federal
78
Employees Retirement Act of 1986 in lieu of the Social Security Act.
Additionally, in 1935, Congress did not extend Social Security coverage to state
and local government employees due to concerns regarding the constitutionality of
imposing a Social Security tax on state governments. Subsequent legislation in
1950 permitted state and local governments that lacked a pension plan to elect
coverage for their employees through the Social Security system. Additional
legislation in 1954 extended the option to state and local government employees
already covered by a pension plan if a majority of governmental employees within a
given jurisdiction concurred in the decision.so The legislation originally permitted
state and local government employees to terminate coverage under the Social
Security system; however, the Social Security Amendments Act of 1983 prohibits
states from terminating coverage agreements entered into on or after April 20,
74. 42 U.S.C. § 415(b)(1)(A), (b)(2)(A)(i), (b)(2)(B)(i).
75. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 17, at 3.
76. Nat'l Comm'n on Soc. Sec., Social Security in America's Future: Final Report of the National
Commission on Social Security, March, 1981, SOCIAL SECURITY ONLINE, available at
http://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/80commission.html.
77. Social Security Amendments Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. 410 (2006)).
78. 42 U.S.C. § 410(a)(5)(H) (2008).
79. Nat'l Comm'n on Soc. Sec., Social Security in America's Future: Final Report of the National
Commission on Social Security, March, 1981, SOCIAL SECURITY ONLINE, available at
http://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/80commission.html.
80. Nat'l Comm'n on Soc. Sec., Social Security in America's Future: Final Report of the National




1983.81 Thus, Title II excludes from the definition of Social Security covered
employment the services performed by federal employees who were employed
before 1984 or who elected coverage through the Federal Employees Retirement
Act." Additionally, the definition excludes services performed by state and local
government employees who have not elected coverage through the Social Security
system.84 The result is logical as federal, state, and local government employees do
not pay Social Security taxes on their earnings, but rather, pay into altemative
. 85
pension programs.
Even if a worker's employment record reflects significant periods of noncovered
employment, the worker may still qualify for Social Security coverage because she
satisfies the minimum requirement of 10 years (40 quarters) of earnings in Social
Security covered employment. Examples of workers with this type of employment
record include public school teachers, who hold Social Security covered
employment during the summer months, professors at public universities who
previously worked at private universities, or police officers who retire early and
take employment in the private sector." When a worker has less than 35 years of
Social Security covered employment, the SSA enters a zero value for wages in
calendar years during which the worker only derived earnings through noncovered
employment. However, the formula for calculating AIME continues to assume
that such workers held Social Security covered employment for 35 years." The
averaging provision in the Social Security benefits formula has the effect of
decreasing a worker's average lifetime earnings for workers with both covered and
noncovered employment.
To illustrate application of the Social Security benefits formula to workers who
held both covered and noncovered employment, consider the hypothetical high-
income worker, average-income worker, and low-income worker from the previous
example. Here each worker earned the same average indexed annual salary as
before - $98,388, $45,000, and $9,000 - respectively; however, each worker held
Social Security covered employment for 15 years, and noncovered employment for
20 years. As the high-income worker's employment record reflects 20 years of zero
earnings for purposes of calculating AIME, his AIME is reduced to $3,513.90
(($98,388 * 15) / 420).90 Consequently, if the high-income worker attains early
retirement age in 2012, she will have a PIA of $1,569.30 (($767 *.9) + (($3,513.90
81. 42 U.S.C. § 418(f) (2006); Social Security Amendments Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 418) (1983).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 410(a)(5)(B)(i).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 410(a)(5)(H).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 410(a)(7).
85. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 17, at 3.
86. 42 U.S.C. § 414(a)(2) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 413(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(7)(D) (2006).
87. 42 U.S.C. 410(a)(5), (7); see also, Brown & Weisbenner, supra note 21, at 1 (citing as an example a
professor who worked for a public university and a private university).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 415(b)(1)(A).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(1)(A), (a)(7)(B)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 415(b)(1).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 415(b) (the calculation ignores 42 U.S.C. § 415(b)(1)(A) which considers years of Social
Security covered employment).
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- $767) * .32).91 For the high-income worker, the effect of noncovered employment
is to shift a greater portion of her earnings into the first and second brackets of
AIME, resulting in a higher benefits replacement rate (the ratio of PIA to AIME)
then her counterpart with 35 years of Social Security covered employment - here,
the high-income worked receives a replacement rate of 45 percent.
The effect of an employment record including noncovered employment is
similar for the average-income worker. Here, the average-income worker has a
reduced AIME of $1,607.10 (($45,000 * 15) / 420)9 and a PIA of $989.10 (($767
*.9) + (($1,607.10 - $767) * .32).93 While the average-income worker in the
previous example with 35 years of Social Security covered employment received a
replacement rate of 44 percent, her counterpart in the present example receives a
replacement rate of 62 percent.
Finally, with an employment record that only reflects 15 years of Social
Security covered employment, the low-income worker has AIME of $321.40
(($9,000 * 15) / 420)94 and will have a PIA of $289.30 ($389.30 * .9)." Note here
that the low-income worker in this example receives the same replacement rate as
his counterpart with 35 years of Social Security covered employment; given the
low-income worker's very small AIME, the percentage factor for the first bracket
of AIME applies regardless of her employment record. These examples
demonstrate that an employment record that includes noncovered employment
alters the intended progressivity of the Social Security benefits formula by
necessarily increasing benefit replacement rates for average and high-income
workers. Politicians and scholars often refer to the higher replacement rates that
certain workers who held both covered and noncovered employment receive under
the Social Security benefits formula as 'windfall' benefits.
AIME PIA Replacement AIME PIA Replacement
(worker with under Rate (based (without Rate
identical Social only on the WEP)
earns Security covered
stemming Benefits earnings)




High- $8,199 $2,460.70 30 percent $3,513.90 $1,569.30 45 percent
Income
Worker
91. 42 U.S.C. § 415(a) (the calculation ignores 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(7) which reduces the replacement rate
to 40 percent for workers who held noncovered employment).
92. 42 U.S.C. § 415(b) (the calculation ignores 42 U.S.C. § 415(b)(1)(A) which considers years of Social
Security covered employment).
93. 42 U.S.C. § 415(a) (the calculation ignores 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(7) which reduces the replacement rate
to 40 percent for workers who held noncovered employment).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 415(b) (the calculation ignores 42 U.S.C. § 415(b)(1)(A) which considers years of Social
Security covered employment).
95. 42 U.S.C. § 415(a) (the calculation ignores 42. U.S.C. § 415(a)(7) which reduces the replacement
rate to 40 percent for workers who held noncovered employment).
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Average- $3,750 $1,644.80 44 percent $1,607.10 $989.10 62 percent
Income
Worker
Low- $750 $675 90 percent $321.40 $289.30 90 percent
Income
Worker
E. Towards Enactment of the WEP
The National Commission on Social Security, which Congress created in
December 1977 to study the fiscal status of the Old Age, Survivors, and Disability
Insurance program and to identify any inequities that affect substantial numbers of
insured workers, was one of the first governmental bodies to identify the problem
of 'windfall' benefits accruing to individuals who held both covered and
noncovered employment. 97 The Commission released its report in March 1981,
proposing 88 modifications to the Social Security system. Even so, the
Commission concluded that the Social Security system was "sound in principle,"
and that the system was the "best structure of income support for the United
States."99 Among the Commission's numerous proposals, the Commission
recommended that Congress eliminate the 'windfall' benefits accruing to
individuals who held both covered and noncovered employment.oo To redress the
'windfall' benefits problem, the Commission recommended a dual approach: (1)
mandatory Social Security coverage for all future federal, state, and local
government employees"o and (2) a modified formula for deriving the PIA of
existing federal, state, and local government employees who have future
noncovered employment.102 While the Commission concluded that in principle,
Social Security coverage should extend to the entire American workforce, the
Commission ultimately determined that mandatory participation in the Social
Security system should not extend to government workers to whom government
pension programs already provided coverage.os As the Commission's mandatory
coverage proposal did not apply to existing government employees, the proposal
left open the possibility of existing government employees holding future
noncovered employment.104 For these government workers, the Commission
recommended a rapid phase-out of windfall benefits through a modification to the
PIA formula applicable to future non-covered employment."o The Commission's
96. Social Security Amendments of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-216, 91 Stat. 1509 (1977) (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 907).
97. Nat'1 Comm'n on Soc. Sec., Social Security in America's Future: Final Report of the National
Commission on Social Security, March, 1981, SOCIAL SECURITY ONLINE, available at
http://www.ssa.gov/history/reports/80commission.html.
98. Id. at 3 and 10.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 171.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 191.
103. Id. at 170.
104. Id. at 172.
105. Id. at 191.
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formula regarded all future employment, whether covered or noncovered, as Social
Security covered employment.16 To derive PIA, the Commission's formula applied
the percentage factors to AIME; however, the formula added an additional step -
multiply AIME by the ratio of covered to noncovered AIME to downward adjust
PIA in proportion to covered employment.'o
On December 16, 1981, President Reagan promulgated Executive Order 12335,
which created the National Commission on Social Security Reform (NCSSR), a
bipartisan commission tasked with "review[ing] relevant analyses of the current and
long-term financial condition of the Social Security trust funds; indentify[ing]
problems that may threaten the long-term solvency of such funds; [and] analyz[ing]
potential solutions. . . that will both assure the financial integrity of the Social
Security system and the provision of appropriate benefits."' 8 The NCSSR released
its report on January 20, 1983 recommending, among other more significant
proposals, modifying the computation for PIA for workers who split their careers
between Social Security covered employment and noncovered employment for
workers first reaching early retirement age after 1983.109 The NCSSR suggested two
alternative approaches to addressing the problem of 'windfall' benefits accruing to
high-income workers with short periods of Social Security covered employment.o
To begin, the NCSSR proposed downward adjusting the PIA benefit formula for
workers who held both covered and noncovered employment by applying the
second percentage factor (32 percent) to the first bracket of AIME (ordinarily a
replacement rate of 90 percent applies to the first bracket)."' However, the NCSSR
suggested that application of the modified formula should be limited by the size of
a worker's noncovered pension - specifically, the reduction in benefits should not
exceed the value of the noncovered pension.11 Alternatively, the NCSSR proposed
maintaining the present existing benefit formula, but applying the formula to both
covered and noncovered employment to determine a replacement rate for covered
employment based on the ratio of benefits payable to covered employment."' In
106. Id.
107. Id. To date, Congress has not implemented this proposal. See generally, 42 U.S.C. § 415 (2006).
However, During markup sessions on the Social Security Amendments Act of 1983, the Subcommittee on
Social Security of the House Committee on Ways and Means considered the NCSSR's alternative approaches
to addressing 'windfall' benefits, and concluded that including non-covered wages in the calculation for
AIME would pose "insurmountable administrative problems. John A. Svahn & Mary Ross, Social Security
Amendments of 1983: Legislative History and Summary ofProvisions, 46 SOC. SECURITY BULL. 3, 10 (1983).
Senator Hutchison and Representative Brady have introduced a bill that employs a similar mechanism during
every Congress from 2004 to 2011. H.R. 2797, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 113, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 1221,
111th Cong. (2009); S. 490, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 2772, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1647, 110th Cong.
(2007); H.R. 1714, 109th Cong. (2005); S. 866, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 4391, 108th Cong. (2004); S. 2455
108th Cong. (2004); See infra, Legislative Action; This Article proposes a method of adjusting benefits for
workers who held both covered and noncovered employment that achieves a similar result, but through a
different mechanism. See Discussion infra Part 6 Recommendation.
108. Exec. Order No. 12,335, 46 Fed. Reg. 61,633 (Dec. 16, 1981).
109. Nat'1 Comm'n on Soc. Sec. Review, Report of the National Commission on Social Security Reform,







making its proposals, the NCSSR referenced concern for the equity of permitting
'windfall' benefits to workers who held both covered and noncovered employment,
and noted that its proposals would impose a net short-range cost.11 Accordingly, a
concern for the solvency of the Social Security System did not motivate the
NCSSR's proposals to address these 'windfall' benefits.
F. WEP: Legislative History
The legislative solution to the problem of 'windfall' benefits accruing to
workers who held both covered and noncovered employment - the WEP - was
enacted on April 20, 1983 with passage of the Social Security Amendment Act of
1983 ("the Act")."' Aimed at comprehensive reform of the Social Security system,
the Act included numerous other notable provisions including: (1) provision for a
gradual increase in full retirement age from age 65 to age 67,' (2) extension of
mandatory coverage to all federal workers hired after 1984,17 and (3) application of
the federal income tax to a portion of certain high-income worker's Social Security
benefits."' The legislative process began on January 26, 1983, six days after the
NCSSR released its report, when Senator Robert Dole introduced S.1," which
included the NCSSR's recommendations regarding the WEP.120 During February
1983, the Subcommittee on Social Security of the House Committee on Ways and
Means began markup sessions on a draft bill.12 During markup sessions, the
Subcommittee considered the NCSSR's alternative approaches to addressing
'windfall' benefits, and concluded that including non-covered wages in the
calculation for AIME would pose "insurmountable administrative problems."12
Instead, the Subcommittee adopted the NCSSR's recommendation of a reduced
percentage factor for the first bracket of AIME in the calculation for PIA, finding
that modification of the formula would produce results generally similar to
inclusion of noncovered wages in AIME.12 However, the House Report of the full
House Committee on Ways and Means set the applicable percentage factor at 61
percentl24 rather than 32 percent as recommended by the NCSSR. 12 The provision
114. Id.
115. Social Security Amendments Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. 216) (2006).
116. Social Security Amendments Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. 216 (2006)).
117. Social Security Amendments Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65 (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. 210 (2006)).
118. Social Security Amendments Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, 97 Stat. 65 (codified as amended at 26
U.S.C. 86 (2006)).
119. S. 1, 98th Cong. (1983).
120. John A. Svahn & Mary Ross, Social Security Amendments of 1983: Legislative History and Summary
ofProvisions, 46 Soc. SECURITY BULL. 3, 8 (1983).
121. Id. at 10.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. H.R. REP. No. 98-25, pt. 1, Section II Summary of Principal Provisions (1983).
125. Nat'l Comm'n on Soc. Sec. Review, Report of the National Commission on Social Security Reform,
46 Soc. SECURITY BULL. 3, 7 (1983).
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was to become applicable to individuals reaching age 60 after December 31, 1983,
and was accompanied by a guarantee that application of the provision would not
result in a decrease in benefits greater than one-half of a noncovered pension.16 The
Committee's bill became H.R. 1900 and was passed in the House of Representative
on March 9, 1983 incorporating these provisions.127
The Senate Finance Committee began markup sessions on S.1 the day H.R.
1900 passed, allowing the Committee to consider the House bill's proposed
modifications.12 In the Senate Report of March 11, 1983, the Committee adopted
the NCSSR's recommendation for a modified PIA calculation to eliminate
'windfall' benefits that would apply to individuals qualifying for a pension based
on noncovered employment after 1983.129 While the Committee selected 32 percent
as the appropriate percentage factor applicable to the first bracket of AIME for
workers who held both covered and noncovered employment, the Committee
deviated from the NCSSR's recommendation by providing a phase-in of the WEP -
a reduction of 10 percentage points for each year an individual falls short of 30
years of covered employment. 1o The Committee sought to protect individuals with
small pensions stemming from non-covered employment by limiting operation of
the provision to a reduction of one-third the value of a noncovered pension.' The
Senate Finance Committee's modified version of S.1 became Amendment Number
516, which passed the Senate on March 23, 1983 as an amendment to H.R. 1900132
Thereafter, the House and Senate appointed a Conference Committee that
considered the various modifications to the Social Security System on March 24,
1983. In considering the WEP, the Conference Committee reached a compromise
between the House and Senate proposals regarding the percentage factor applicable
to the first bracket of AIME for individuals who held both covered and noncovered
employment, setting the percentage factor at 40 percent. 13 4 The conference
agreement incorporated the phase-in provision from the Senate's amendment
reducing the applicable percentage factor at a rate of 10 percentage points for each
year below 30 years of covered employment. ' H.R. 1900, as agreed to in the
Conference Committee Report, passed in the House on March 24 and the Senate on
116
March 25, and President Regan signed the bill into law on April 20, 1983.
126. H.R. REP. No. 98-25, pt. 1, Section II Summary of Principal Provisions (1983).(1983).
127. John A. Svahn & Mary Ross, Social Security Amendments of 1983: Legislative History and Summary
of Provisions, 46 Soc. SECURITY BULL. 3, 14 (1983).
128. Id. at 17.
129. S REP. NO. 98-23, at 5-6 (1983).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. John A. Svahn & Mary Ross, Social Security Amendments of 1983: Legislative History and Summary
ofProvisions, 46 Soc. SECURITY BULL. 3, 17, 21 (1983).
133. Id. at 23.
134. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 98-47, p. 13-16 (1983).
135. Id.
136. John A. Svahn & Mary Ross, Social Security Amendments of 1983: Legislative History and Summary
ofProvisions, 46 Soc. SECURITY BULL. 3, 24 (1983).
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G. The WEP Formula
The WEP is potentially applicable to individuals reaching early retirement age
or becoming eligible for disability benefits after 1985, who also qualify, after 1985,
for a government pension based, in whole or in part, upon noncovered
137employment. However, even if a worker meets these two requirements, Title II
provides several exclusions from application of the WEP. For example, the WEP
does not apply to: (1) an individual that was a government employee before January
1, 1984 to whom the Social Security Amendments Act of 1983 extended mandatory
social security coverage;"3 (2) individuals who receive benefits from foreign Social
Security systems where the foreign country has reached a totalization agreement
with the United States;'39 and (3) individuals who receive a pension under the
Railroad Retirement Act of 1937 or 1974.'4 Additionally, the WEP does not apply
to individuals who receive at least 30 years of substantial earnings in Social
Security covered employment.14' The SSA determines the amount of earnings
necessary to qualify as "substantial earnings" by multiplying the contribution and
benefit base, as determined prior to the Social Security Amendments of 1977
($84,300 in 2013) by 25 percent.142 Thus, in 2013, earnings of $21,075 qualify as
"substantial earnings." 43 Finally, the WEP is applicable to derivative Social
Security benefits, including spousal and dependent benefits; however, the provision
does not apply to survivors' benefits.'44
The WEP directs the SSA to follow the traditional procedure for determining
AIME and PIA for a worker with less than 30 years of Social Security covered
employment who qualifies for a pension based on noncovered employment.145
However, the WEP modifies the formula for PIA by replacing the traditional
percentage factor applicable to the first bracket of AIME - 90 percent - with a
percentage factor of 40 percent for workers with earnings deriving from noncovered
146employment. Thus, the WEP decreases the replacement rate for the first bracket
of AIME - the ratio between PIA and AIME - for such workers. For individuals
attaining early retirement age between 1986 and 1990, the WEP phased-in by
decreasing the traditional 90 percent rate applicable to the first bracket of AIME by
10 percentage points per year over the 5-year phase-in period. 14 Additionally, the
137. 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(7)(A)(i), (ii) (2006).
138. 42 U.S.C. § 415(A)(7)(E).
139. 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(7)(A)(ii).
140. Id.
141. 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(7)(D).
142. 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(1)(C)(ii), (a)(7)(D); Cost-of-Living Increase and Other Determinations for 2013,
77 Fed. Reg. 65,754 (Oct. 30, 2012); Cost-of-Living Increase and Other Determinations for 2012, 76 Fed.
Reg. 66,111, 66,115 (Oct. 25, 2011) (setting forth the contribution and benefits base amounts for 2012 as
$81,900 and substantial earnings as $20,475).
143. Cost-of-Living Increase and Other Determinations for 2013, 77 Fed. Reg. 65,754 (Oct. 30, 2012).
144. 42 U.S.C. § 402 (2006).
145. 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(7)(A)(ii), (a)(7)(B)(i), (a)(7)(D).
146. 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(7)(B)(i).
147. 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(7)(B)(ii)(I)-(IV).
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WEP contains a second formulal48 that is applicable in certain circumstance to
protect low-income workers.149 Congress included the second formula as a
guarantee that the reduction in a worker's Social Security benefits due to
application of the WEP will not exceed one-half of the value of a worker's
noncovered pension.so The second formula instructs the SSA to calculate PIA for a
worker with noncovered employment using the traditional percentage factors, but to
subtract one-half the value of the worker's noncovered pension from PIA. ' The
greater of the amounts derived from the first and second formulas becomes the
worker's PIA.15 When an individual has an employment record with between 21
and 29 years of substantial earnings in Social Security covered employment, the
WEP is not fully applicable."' For such individuals, the WEP applies the
percentage factor of 40 percent to the first bracket of AIME; however, each
additional year of substantial earnings in Social Security covered employment
above 20 years increases the applicable percentage factor by five percentage
points.15 4 Thus, for such workers, the percentage factors applicable to the first
bracket of AIME range from 45 percent for 21 years of substantial earnings in
Social Security covered employment, to 85 percent for 29 years.
As a demonstration of the WEP's application to individuals with both Social
Security covered employment and noncovered employment, consider again the
example of the high-income worker, average-income worker, and low-income
worker. As in the previous examples, the workers received average indexed annual
earnings of $98,388, $45,000, and $9,000 respectively; however, each worker held
Social Security covered employment for 15 years and noncovered employment for
20 years. Since AIME is based on the worker's average earnings over 35 years (420
months), including a zero value for calendar years without substantial earnings in
Social Security covered employment, the AIME for each worker is $3,513.90,
$1,607.10, and $321.40 respectively (the same result as in the second example). 55
Accordingly, the PIA of the high-income worker is $1,185.8 (($767 *.4) +
(($3,513.90 - $767) * .32),"s' resulting in a replacement rate of 34 percent. Note that
application of the WEP has reduced the replacement rate for the worker with
noncovered employment from 45 percent to 34 percent; however, the high-income
worker still receives a replacement rate four percent greater than his counterpart
with 35 years of Social Security covered employment. 1 Similarly, the average
income worker receives a PIA of $575.60 (($767 *.4) + (($1,607.10 - $767) *
148. Id.
149. ALLISON M. SHELTON, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE., 98-35, SOCIAL SECURITY: THE WINDFALL
ELIMINATION PROVISION (WEP) (2010); S. Rep. No. 98-23, at p. 15 (1983).
150. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 98-47, at 120-121 (1983).
151. 42 U.SC. § 415(a)(7)(B)(i).
152. 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(7)(B)(i).
153. 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(7)(D).
154. Id.
155. See Discussion supra Parts 2.C: The Social Security Benefits Formula, 2.D: Effect of Noncovered
Employment under the Social Security Benefits Formula.
156. 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(1)(A), (a)(7)(B)(ii)(V).
157. See Discussion supra Parts 2.C: The Social Security Benefits Formula, 2.D: Effect of Noncovered
Employment under the Social Security Benefits Formula.
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.32) or a replacement rate of 36 percent. Here, the WEP has reduced the benefit
replacement rate for the average-income worker with both covered and noncovered
employment from 62 to 36 percent, but the worker now receives a replacement rate
that is eight percent lower than his counterpart with 35 years of Social Security
covered employment.! Finally, the low-income worker's PIA is $128.60 ($321.40
* .4),160 which is equal to a replacement rate of 40 percent. As the low-income
worker's AIME falls entirely within the bracket to which the first percentage factor
(90 percent) traditionally applies, application of the WEP has decreased the
replacement rate that the Social Security benefits formula traditionally affords the
low-income worker by 50 percent.
AIME (worker PIA under Rep. AIME PIA Rep. PIA (with Rep. Rate
with identical Social Rate (based (without Rate the WEP
earns Security only on the WEP)
stemming only Benefits covered
from 35 years Formula earnings)
of covered
employment)
High- $8,199 $2,460.70 30% $3,513.90 $1,569.30 45% $1,185.80 34%
Income
Worker
Average- $3,750 $1,644.80 44% $1,607.10 $989.10 62% $4,575.60 36%
Income
Worker
Low- $750 $675 90% $321.40 $289.30 90% $128.60 40%
Income
Worker
As noted above, two components of the WEP can mitigate its affects for these
hypothetical workers: (1) the guarantee of a maximum reduction equal to one-half
the value of a worker's non-covered pensionl62 and (2) a greater applicable
percentage factor to the first bracket of AIME for 21-29 years of Social Security
covered employment. 16 First, the maximum possible benefit reduction for a worker
attaining early retirement age in 2012, regardless of income, is $383.50 ($4,602
annually).'" This limitation on the benefit reduction arises because the WEP only
adjusts the percentage factor applicable to the first bracket of AIME (reduction of
the replacement rate for the first $767 of AIME from 90 percent to 40 percent).
As the reduction in benefits due to the WEP cannot exceed one-half the value of a
noncovered pension, the WEP will not be fully applicable to any worker, regardless
158. 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(1)(A), (a)(7)(B)(ii)(V).
159. See Discussion supra Parts 2.C: The Social Security Benefits Formula, 2.D: Effect of Noncovered
Employment under the Social Security Benefits Formula.
160. 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(1)(A), (a)(7)(B)(ii)(V).
161. See Discussion supra Part 2.C: The Social Security Benefits Formula.
162. 42 U.S.C. § 414(a)(7)(B)(i).
163. 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(7)(D).
164. 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(1)(A), (a)(l)(B)(i), (a)(7)(B)(ii)(V).
165. Id.
[Vol. 39:2200
An Equitable Approach to Addressing 'Windfall' Benefits
of income, who receives a government pension of less than $767 ($383.50 * 2) per
month. In the previous examples, the low-income worker received a PIA of $690.30
before application of the WEP, but a PIA of $306.80 after application of the WEP -
a reduction of $383.50 ($690.30 - $306.80). If the low-income worker, for example,
is concurrently entitled to receive a noncovered pension of $500 per month, by
operation of the guarantee, the WEP can only reduce his PIA to $440.30 ($690.3 -
($500 / 2)) because application of the reduced percentage factor to the first bracket
of AIME results in a benefit reduction greater than one-half of the noncovered
pension.
Second, the WEP reduces the percentage factor applicable to the first bracket of
AIME from 90 percent to 40 percent; however, if a worker has an employment
record consisting of 21-29 years of substantial earnings in Social Security covered
employment, the applicable percentage factor increases by five percentage points
per year of additional employment.16 If the average-income worker from the
previous example worked for 25 years in Social Security covered employment
(rather than 20 years), his PIA under the WEP would increase from $575.60 (($767
*.4) + (($1,607.10 - $767) * .32) to $767.4 (($767 *.65) + (($1,607.10 - $767) *
.32). Similar results occur for the low-income and high-income workers.
H. WEP Applicability
According to the Government Accountability Office, in 2007 the Social
Security system covered approximately 96 percent of the American workforce; the
remaining four percent of noncovered workers were predominately public
employees." While noncovered workers comprised a relatively small percentage of
the American workforce, these workers accounted for 25 percent of public
employees, and were disproportionately concentrated in state and local
governments (approximately 90 percent of noncovered workers).169 Recently, SSA
data, released in 2005, indicates that there were approximately 6.8 million
noncovered state and local government workers, and half a million noncovered
federal government workers.170 States vary significantly in the extent to which
governments have elected Social Security coverage for state and local employees.
For example, nearly all state and local government employees receive Social
Security coverage in New York and Vermont; by contrast, less than 5 percent of
state and local government employees pay into the Social Security system in
Massachusetts and Ohio. 172 Moreover, 70 percent of noncovered state and local
government employees are concentrated in only seven states - California,
Colorado, Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Ohio, and Texas.m17 In 2009, the SSA
166. 42 U.S.C. § 415((a)(7)(D).
167. Id.
168. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 17, at 1.
169. Id. at 1, 3.
170. Id.





provided the Congressional Research Service with data on the number of
beneficiaries for whom the WEP reduced benefits; at the time, 1,197,020 Social
Security beneficiaries received reduced benefits by operation of the WEP (including
retired and disabled workers, as well as dependents).174 In general, the WEP affects
male retirees and disabled workers disproportionately; approximately 65 percent of
WEP affected beneficiaries were male in 2006.1' At the time, eight states -
California, Florida, Illinois, Maryland, Massachusetts, Ohio, Texas, and Virginia,
accounted for 50 percent of WEP affected beneficiaries. If one considers WEP
affected beneficiaries as a percentage of total Social Security recipients within a
state, then Alaska, Colorado, Maine, Maryland, Nevada, and Ohio are the states
most affected by the provision, with the ratio ranging from a low of 4.7 in Nevada
to a high of 10.6 percent in Alaska. 77
III. WEP: THE PROBLEMS
Reducing Social Security benefits for over one million retired federal, state,
and local government employees 7 1 the WEP is an extremely controversial
component of the Social Security Act. The WEP has elicited a variety of criticisms
from scholars and opponents, including: (1) the WEP has a disproportionate impact
on low-income workers relative to high-income workers, 1 (2) the SSA has
insufficient information to apply the provision to all of the targeted beneficiaries,"
and (3) SSA efforts to communicate with the public about the provision are
insufficient, resulting in public misperception and resentment, as well as
significant hardship where workers mistakenly fail to account for the provision's
effects.'
A. Disproportionate Impact
Among criticisms of the WEP, the charge that the WEP disproportionately
affects low-income workers appears frequently in scholarly literature.' As
structured, the WEP operates to the disadvantage of low-income workers in three
ways: (1) under the WEP, the adjustment to Social Security benefits based on
174. ALLISON M. SHELTON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-35, SOCIAL SECURITY: THE WINDFALL
ELIMINATION PROVISION (WEP) 4-5 (2010).
175. Barbara A. Lingg, Social Security Beneficiaries Affected by the Windfall Elimination Provision in
2006, 68 Soc. SECURITY BULL. 1, 3 (2008).
176. Id.
177. Lingg, supra note 170, at 10-11.
178. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 17, at 4.
179. Brown & Weisbenner, supra note 21, at 8-13.
U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 17, at 4-7 (2007).
181. . Brown & Weisbenner, supra note 21, atl9; ALLISON M. SHELTON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-35,
SOCIAL SECURITY: THE WINDFALL ELIMINATION PROVISION (WEP) 19 (2010).
182. Id. at 6.
183. . Brown & Weisbenner, supra note 21, at 8-13 (performing an analysis similar to the proceeding
sections); Francine Lipman, Social Security Benefits 101, 53 ORANGE COUNTY LAW. 30, 32-33 (2011);
ALLISON M. SHELTON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-35, SOCIAL SECURITY: THE WINDFALL ELIMINATION
PROVISION (WEP) 6 (2010).
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noncovered employment is highly regressive;184 (2) high-income workers are more
likely to cross the WEP's substantial earnings threshold, thereby becoming eligible
for a significant increase in benefits;"' and (3) the WEP affords high-income
workers a replacement rate above the rate they would be statutorily entitled to under
the general formula of the Social Security system while penalizing low-income
workers with a lower replacement rate.186 This Part of the Article examines each
point in turn.
1. The WEP's Regressive Nature
Having recognized that high-income workers with significant periods of
noncovered employment received 'windfall' benefits under the traditional formula
by operation of the averaging provision, Congress enacted the WEP to preserve
the progressivity of the Social Security benefits formula. Notwithstanding
Congress' effort to preserve the formula's progressivity, the WEP itself is
regressive, and does not effectively attain Congress' goal.
Although the WEP provides for a uniform reduction, regardless of income, in
the percentage factor applicable to the first bracket of AIME,' the reduction has a
disproportionate impact on low-income workers.19 The disproportionate impact
experienced by low-income workers with noncovered employment stems directly
from the design of the WEP.190 As the WEP is only applicable to the first bracket of
AIME,191 the benefit reduction gradually increases as earnings increase within the
first bracket of AIME, reaching the maximum WEP reduction at the first bendpoint
($767 in 2012).192 Consequently, the WEP imposes a maximum benefit reduction of
383.50193 monthly in 2012 ($4,602 annually) on all workers with 20 or fewer years
of Social Security covered employment and AIME at or above the first bendpoint.
While the benefit reduction is constant at or above an AIME of $767, as a
worker's AIME increases, the reduction in benefits decreases as a percentage of
AIME. For example, a worker with AIME of $767 receives a 50 percent benefit
reduction ($383.50 / $767) through operation of the WEP, while a worker with an
194
AIME representing maximum taxable earnings through 2012 ($8,199) receives
less than a five percent benefit reduction ($383.50 / $8,199).195 Demonstrating the
regressive nature of the WEP reduction, Figure 1 plots the replacement rate (the
ratio of AIME to PIA) over varying levels of income for two workers retiring at full
184. . See Discussion infra Part 3.A.I: The WEP's Regressive Nature.
185. . See Discussion infra Part 3.A.II: Disproportionate Affect of the Substantial Earnings Test.
186. . See Discussion infra Part 3.A.III: Comparison with a Proportional WEP.
187. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 98-47, at 120 (1983).
188. 42 U.S.C § 415(a)(7)(B)(ii)(V) (2006).
189. Brown & Weisbenner, supra note 21, at 8.
190. Francine Lipman, Social Security Benefits 101, 53 ORANGE COUNTY LAW. 30, 32 (2011).
191. 42 U.S.C § 415(a)(7)(B)(i).
192. 42 U.S.C § 415(a)(1)(B)(i), (ii); Cost-of-Living Increase and Other Determinations for 2012, 76 Fed.
Reg. 66,111, 66,115 (Oct. 25, 2011).
193. ($767 * .9) - (S767 * .4) = $383.50.
194. http://www.ssa.gov/oact/COLA/Benefits.htrnl.
195. 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(1)(A), (a)(7)(B)(ii)(V).
2032012-13]
204 Journal ofLegislation [Vol. 39:2
retirement age: (1) the line beginning at a replacement rate of 90 percent represents
a worker who is exempt from the WEP because she received substantial earnings in
Social Security covered employment for 30 or more years; (2) the line originating
at a replacement rate of 40 percent represents a worker who is subject to the WEP
because she worked in Social Security covered employment for 20 or fewer
years.19 The difference between the two lines represents the WEP reduction, and
the reduction is significantly larger for low-income workers than for their high-
income counterparts. Thus, in seeking to address 'windfall' benefits that accrue to
high-income workers with significant periods of noncovered employment, Congress
enacted a provision that imposes a proportionally larger benefit reduction on low-
income workers. As such, the WEP neither replicates the replacement rates of the
Social Security benefits formula, nor tracks its progressivity.
PIA/ AIME with and without WEP
100
90 - PIA/ AIME











2. Disproportionate Impact of the Substantial Earnings Test
Besides creating a regressive benefit reduction, the WEP disproportionately
impacts low-income workers by operation of its provision for phasing-in the
reduced replacement rate, as the moderating effect of the provision is not equally
available to low-income workers. Recall that the WEP applies a reduced percentage
factor of 40 percent to the first bracket of AIME for individuals with 20 or fewer
years of substantial earnings in Social Security covered employment.' Where an
individual receives between 21 and 29 years of substantial earnings in Social
Security covered employment, the WEP gradually implements the reduced
196. 42 U.S.C § 415(a)(7)(D).
197. 42 U.S.C § 415(a)(7)(B)(i), (a)(7)(D).
198. 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(7)(D).
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percentage factor.19 For such individuals, the WEP applies the reduced percentage
factor of 40 percent, but for each additional year above 20 years of substantial
earnings in Social Security covered employment, the WEP increases the applicable
percentage factor by five percentage points.200 At 30 years of substantial earnings in
201
Social Security covered employment, the WEP is fully phased-out. Thus, for
purposes of the phase-in provision, the critical question is whether a worker
received substantial earnings in Social Security covered employment during a given
year. In 2012, to qualify for a year of substantial earnings, a worker must receive
$20,475 or more in Social Security covered employment."0
To illustrate the issue of access to the phase-in provision, consider the
unrealistic, but illustrative example of a worker who chooses to split her earning
201
potential equally between covered and noncovered employment. If such an
individual earns $40,950 or more in 2012, she will receive at least $20,475 in Social
Security covered employment thereby crossing the substantial earnings threshold.204
By contrast, if the worker earns $30,000 in 2012, her earnings of $15,000 in Social
Security covered employment will be insufficient to satisfy the substantial earnings
201
test. While the scenario of an individual electing to split her earning potential
equally between covered and noncovered employment is unrealistic, the example
demonstrates that individuals with a higher earning potential are more likely to
cross the substantial earnings threshold - a threshold which can turn on a single
dollar of income.
For individuals to whom the phase-in provision potentially applies, the effect of
an additional year of substantial earnings in Social Security covered employment
can be quite significant. Consider, for example, a hypothetical low-income worker
who meets the following criteria: the individual (1) has an AIME of $767; (2)
reaches early retirement age in 2012; and (3) defers retirement until full retirement
age. If the individual's employment record reflects 20 years of Social Security
covered employment, her PIA will be $306.80 ($767 * .4).206 By contrast, an
individual whose employment record reflects an additional year of substantial
earnings in Social Security covered employment will receive a PIA of $345.15
207
($767 * .45). Thus, if one holds all other criteria constant, but permits the number
of years of covered employment to fluctuate, then each additional year of
substantial earnings in Social Security covered employment, above 20 years, results




202. 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(1)(C)(ii), (a)(7)(D); Cost-of-Living Increase and Other Determinations for 2012,
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203. Brown & Weisbenner, supra note 21, at 9.
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Although raising a worker's PIA by $38.35 may not appear significant, the
increase to aggregate wage-indexed lifetime earnings that an individual would
ordinarily require to achieve a similar increase of her PIA underscores the
magnitude of the WEP's phase-in provision. As the previous example placed the
individual's AIME at $767, the next additional dollar earned will fall within the
second bracket of AIME - the bracket to which the replacement rate of 32 percent
applies.20 Where AIME falls within the second bracket, absent the phase-in
provision, an individual must earn an additional $50,316 (($38.35 / .32) * 420) in
aggregate wage-indexed lifetime earnings to achieve an increase to her PIA of
$38.35. 209 Even more striking, for a high-income worker - defined as a worker
whose AIME falls within the third bracket - to raise her PIA by $38.35, she would
have to earn additional aggregate wage-indexed lifetime earnings of $107,380
(($38.35 / .15) * 420).210 Thus, the WEP's phase-in provision permits an individual
to avoid significant contribution costs for the bargain price of an additional year of
substantial earnings ($20,475 in 2012).211 However, an additional year of substantial
earnings in Social Security covered employment affords the high-income worker
more than twice the savings in contribution costs as the low-income worker, yet
grants both workers the same increase to PIA. This highlights yet another example
of the WEP's disproportionate impact, particularly where the high-income worker
is already more likely to cross the phase-in provision's substantial earnings
threshold.
3. Comparison with a Proportional WEP
A final approach to understanding the disproportionate impact of the WEP on
low-income workers entails introducing a new concept - a proportional WEP,
which represents an alternative to the present WEP. Seeking to preserve the
progressivity of the Social Security benefits formula, Congress enacted the WEP to
eliminate the 'windfall' benefits that accrue to high-income workers with
significant periods of noncovered employment.212 To accomplish this task, the WEP
reduces the percentage factor ordinarily applicable to the first bracket of AIME to
40 percent.213 The decision to adopt 40 percent as the applicable percentage factor
under the WEP was the product of Congressional bargaining - a compromise
between the Senate and House proposed percentage factors of 32 and 60 percent
respectively.214 Not surprisingly, the WEP is an imprecise, and many would argue
208. 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(1)(A); Cost-of-Living Increase and Other Determinations for 2012, 76 Fed. Reg.
66,111, 66,115 (Oct. 25, 2011).
209. 42 U.S.C. § 515(a)(1)(A).
210. Id.
211. 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(1)(C)(ii), (a)(7)(D); Cost-of-Living Increase and Other Determinations for 2012,
76 Fed. Reg. 66,111, 66,115 (Oct. 25, 2011).
212. . H.R. CONF. REP. No. 98-47, at 120-121 (1983).
213. .42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(7)(B)(ii)(V).
214. . H.R. REP. No. 98-25, at Part I, Section 11 (1983); S REP. No. 98-23, at 15-16 (1983); H.R. CONF.
REP. No.98-47, at 120-121 (1983).
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arbitrary215 provision, that as illustrated in Figure 1, neither tracks the replacement
rates of the Social Security benefits formula, nor tracks its progressivity.216 Given
Congress' purpose in enacting the WEP, the most equitable approach to the
'windfall' benefits problem would entail downward adjusting PIA for workers with
significant periods of noncovered employment, such that the replacement rates
obtained by affected workers would be identical to that of workers with identical
annual incomes earned over 35 years of covered employment. A proportional WEP
would accomplish exactly this task.
Scott Weisbenner and Jeffrey Brown, in a paper entitled The Distributional
Effects of the Social Security Windfall Elimination Provision, analyzed one example
of a proportional WEP.217 The authors suggested calculating AIME based on both a
worker's covered and noncovered earnings.21 Next, to derive PIA, one would apply
the Social Security benefits formula, without the WEP, to the worker's AIME.2 19 As
such, the worker with noncovered employment will receive the exact same
replacement rate as a worker with identical earnings who only held Social Security
covered employment.220 To account for the years during which the worker did not
contribute to the Social Security system, the proportional WEP would decrease PIA
by multiplying the ratio of the worker's covered to total earnings.22 The resulting
figure represents the worker's "covered PIA."222 Imagine, for example two workers
each earning $90,000 per year; however, Worker A held Social Security covered
employment for 35 years, while Worker B held covered employment for 20 years
and noncovered employment for 15 years. Under the proportional WEP, both
workers have the same AIME - $7,500 (($90,000 *35)) / 420).223 Similarly, both
worker's' initially have a PIA of $2,355.90 (.9 * $767) + (.32 * ($4,624 - $767)) +
215. . ALLISON M. SHELTON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-35, SOCIAL SECURITY: THE WINDFALL
ELIMINATION PROVISION (WEP) 3 (2009).
216. . See infra Figure 1.
217. . Brown & Weisbenner, supra note 21, at 5, 10-12. This method first appeared as part of the
NCCSR's recommendation for addressing the WEP. See Discussion, supra Part 2.E: Towards Enactment of
the WEP. During markup sessions on the Social Security Amendments Act of 1983, the Subcommittee on
Social Security of the House Committee on Ways and Means considered the NCSSR's alternative approaches
to addressing 'windfall' benefits, and concluded that including non-covered wages in the calculation for
AIME would pose "insurmountable administrative problems." John A. Svahn & Mary Ross, Social Security
Amendments of 1983: Legislative History and Summary of Provisions, 46 SOC. SECURITY BULL. 3, 10 (1983).
Senator Hutchison and Representative Brady have introduced a bill that employs a similar mechanism during
every Congress from 2004 to 2011. H.R. 2797, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 113, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 1221,
111th Cong. (2009); S. 490, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 2772, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1647, 110th Cong.
(2007); H.R. 1714, 109th Cong. (2005); S. 866, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 4391, 108th Cong. (2004); S. 2455
108th Cong. (2004); See infra, Legislative Action; This Article proposes a method of adjusting benefits for
workers who held both covered and noncovered employment that achieves a similar result, but through a










(.15 * ($7,500 - $4,624)).224 As such, the proportional WEP provides both workers
with the exact same replacement rate based on identical earnings - 31 percent
(($2,355.90 / $7,500) * 100). However, the proportional WEP multiplies Worker
B's PIA by the ratio of covered to total earnings to account for the worker's time in
noncovered employment, resulting in a covered PIA of $1,009.60 ($2,355.90 *
($1,350,000 / $3,150,000)).225
By comparing the replacement rates for a high-income, average-income, and
low-income worker under a proportional WEP and the current law WEP, one can
discern a final manner in which the WEP disproportionately affects low-income
workers. For example, consider Figure 2, which charts the replacement rates over
varying periods of Social Security covered employment for two high-income
workers, each of whom earned $98,388 annually. The bold horizontal line at 30
percent represents the replacement rate that the high-income worker would obtain
under a proportional WEP. The line originating at 30 percent and terminating near
35 percent represents the replacement rates that a worker with identical income
would obtain under the current law WEP based on different combinations of
covered and uncovered employment. Note that the only point that the high-income
worker receives the proper replacement rate under the current law WEP is where
she works in Social Security covered employment for 35 years. Any other
combination of covered and noncovered employment under the current law WEP
results in a replacement rate for a high-income worker above the statutorily
intended replacement rate. Note also that under the current law WEP, as the number
of years the worker held Social Security covered employment increases, the
disparity between replacement rates under the proportional WEP and current law
WEP decreases.
Figure 2
224. 42 U.S.C. 415(a)(7)(A).
225. Brown & Weisbenner, supra note 21, at 5, 10-12.
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By contrast, Figure 3 charts the replacement rates, over varying periods of
Social Security covered employment, for two average-income workers each earning
$50,000 annually. The horizontal line at 43 percent represents the replacement rate
that an average-income worker subject to a proportional WEP would receive,
regardless of the number of years during which the worker held Social Security
covered employment. The line originating at 43 percent and terminating at 37
percent represents the replacement rates that an average-income worker subject to
the current law WEP would receive based on different combinations of covered and
noncovered employment. In this example, where the average-income worker
received less than 20 years of substantial earnings in Social Security covered
employment, her replacement rates are up to eight percent lower than those
obtained by her counterpart who is subject to the proportional WEP. When the
average-income worker has sufficient earnings to cross the substantial earnings
threshold, the replacement rates begin to approach, and eventually surpass, those
obtained by the worker's counterpart who is subject to the proportional WEP.
Finally, at 31 years of substantial earnings in Social Security covered employment,
the replacement rates obtained by the average-income worker begin to decrease
until reaching a replacement rate identical to a worker who held Social Security
covered employment for 35 years.
Average-income Worker: Replacement Rates by Years of Substantial Earnings
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Figure 3
Finally, Figure 4 compares the replacement rates obtained by two low-income
workers, each of whom earned $20,000 annually, for different combinations of
covered and noncovered employment. The horizontal line at 59 percent represents
the replacement rate that the low-income worker would obtain under a proportional
WEP. By contrast, the line originating at 36 percent and terminating at 40 percent
represents the replacement rates the worker would obtain under the current law
2092012-13]1
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WEP. Note that any combination of covered and noncovered employment under
the current law WEP results in a replacement rate for a low-income worker below
the statutorily intended replacement rate. In fact, even where the low-income
worker who held both covered and noncovered employment has an employment
record reflecting 35 years of Social Security covered employment, her replacement
rate falls below that of an identical worker who only held covered employment.
This anomaly occurs because the low-income worker's annual earnings never
crossed the WEP's substantial earnings threshold - $20,475 in 2012.22 Thus,
although the worker's qualification for a noncovered pension subjects him to the
WEP,227 the worker can never qualify for the mitigating effects of the WEP's phase-
in provision.
Low-Income Worker: Replacement Rates by Years of Substantial Earnings
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Figure 4
The foregoing examples demonstrate that under the current law WEP, a high-
income worker will always obtain a replacement rate greater than the statutorily
intended replacement rate. By contrast, the replacement rate obtained by a low-
income worker who does not cross the WEP's substantial earnings threshold will
always fall below those obtained by the worker's counterparts who only held Social
Security covered employment. This is yet another example of the WEP's
disproportionate impact.
226. . 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(1)(C)(ii), (a)(7)(D) (2006); Cost-of-Living Increase and Other Determinations
for 2012, 76 Fed. Reg. 66,111, 66,115 (Oct. 25, 2011).
227. . 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(7)(A), (a)(7)(D).
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B. The SSA Has Insufficient Information to Apply the WEP to All of the Targeted
Beneficiaries
As previously noted, the WEP is potentially applicable to individuals attaining
early retirement age - 62 years of age - after 1985, who also become eligible, after
1985, for a government pension, based in whole or in part, upon noncovered
employment. 2 8 Thus, effective administration of the WEP requires the SSA to
determine which beneficiaries are, or potentially will be, eligible to receive
government pensions based upon noncovered employment.229 Historically, the SSA
relied on a system of self-reporting to determine whether beneficiaries were eligible
for noncovered government pensions.230 When reviewing an initial benefits
application, SSA staff examined an applicant's earnings record to determine
211whether there were significant gaps in the individual's employment history.
When SSA staff identified such a gap in the applicant's employment record, a staff
member was required to determine whether the gap was attributable to noncovered
232
employment. Additionally, SSA staff asked the applicant whether she was
eligible, or will become eligible, to receive a government pension based upon
noncovered employment.233 If an applicant answered in the affirmative, the SSA
would make the appropriate benefit reduction for applicants already receiving a
noncovered pension, or, for applicants with future eligibility, would make a note in
the applicant's file for later action.23 If an applicant indicated that she was not, and
would not become, eligible for a noncovered government pension, "SSA staff
record[ed] and accept[ed] [her] answer unless the staff believe[d] further
investigation [wa]s warranted."235
For federal retirees, the SSA employed an additional level of verification."' On
a monthly basis, the SSA received data listing federal retirees and the amount of
their noncovered pensions from the Office of Personnel Management, the agency
charged with administering the Civil Service Retirement System.23 Upon an
individual's initial application for benefits, the SSA cross-referenced the applicant's
record with the data received from the Office of Personnel Management. 238 Where
the cross-referencing procedure provided evidence that an applicant was receiving a
noncovered federal pension, the SSA noted the pension in the applicant's earnings
record, thereby ensuring compliance with the WEP.23
228. 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(7)(A)(i), (ii).
229. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 17, at 6 (2007).
230. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-98-76, SOCIAL SECURITY: BETTER PAYMENT
CONTROLS FOR BENEFIT REDUCTION PROVISIONS COULD SAVE MILLIONS 4-5 (1998).
231. Id. at 4.
232. Id.
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The SSA expressed concern during the 1990s that its procedures for
administering the WEP required strengthening because it was using a self-reporting
system that lacked an independent source to verify the accuracy of information
240
applicants provided regarding noncovered pensions. In this context, the House
Subcommittee on Social Security instructed the U.S. General Accounting Office to
undertake an examination of the SSA's efforts to administer the WEP, resulting in a
1998 report entitled Social Security: Better Payment Controls for Benefit Reduction
Provisions Could Save Millions.2 4' Based on a study of 36,000 cases for which the
SSA suspected WEP related overpayments to federal retirees, the General
Accounting Office report determined that the SSA erroneously failed to apply the
WEP to approximately 7,130 federal retirees, resulting in total overpayments of
approximately $32 million.24 Employing the study of federal retirees to determine
the amount of WEP related overpayments to state and local government retirees, the
General Accounting Office report determined that the SSA erroneously failed to
apply the WEP to between 4,334 and 10,835 state and local government retirees at
an estimated cost of between $19.5 million and $48.8 million.2 43
Given the large number of beneficiaries to whom the WEP should apply that
the SSA failed to detect, the General Accounting Office proposed two methods to
strengthen procedures for administering the WEP.244 The General Accounting
Office suggested that the SSA expand its effort to verify the accuracy of
information reported by federal retirees by periodically cross-referencing
beneficiary records with the Office of Personnel Management data, rather than
limiting this procedure to the initial application period.24 The General Accounting
Office indicated that the "postentitlement match" procedure would be "relatively
straightforward" as the SSA already receives the necessary data from the Office of
Personnel Management.246 Moreover, SSA staff had already acknowledged that the
procedure was effective for detecting federal retirees who first applied for Social
Security benefits, and later became eligible for a noncovered pension, but failed to
notify the SSA.247
Alternatively, the General Accounting Office proposed that the SSA employ an
independent source to verify the accuracy of information regarding noncovered
pensions provided by state and local government retirees.248 As part of its proposal,
the General Accounting Office identified two alternative sources of independent
verification: (1) the individual retirement systems providing noncovered pensions
240. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-98-76, SOCIAL SECURITY: BETTER PAYMENT
CONTROLS FOR BENEFIT REDUCTION PROVISIONS COULD SAVE MILLIONS 3,16 (1998).
241. Id. at 1.
242. Id. at 11.
243. Id. at 12-13.
244. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-98-76, SOCIAL SECURITY: BETTER PAYMENT
CONTROLS FOR BENEFIT REDUCTION PROVISIONS COULD SAVE MILLIONS 13 (1998).
245. Id. at 13.
246. Id. at 5, 13, 16.
247. Id. at 5.
248. Id. at 13.
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and (2) the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).249 According to the General Accounting
Office, obtaining information on noncovered pensions directly through the
individual retirement systems offered the advantage of timeliness, as the individual
retirement systems possessed the most up to date information regarding their
beneficiaries. 250 However, obtaining the information directly through the individual
retirement systems posed significant administrative challenges, according to the
General Accounting Office, as there were thousands of retirement systems, some of
which state law precluded from disclosing beneficiary information.251 Moreover, all
of the retirement systems would have to develop a reporting mechanism to provide
252
the SSA with pertinent information.
Instead, the General Accounting Office advocated obtaining the necessary
information regarding noncovered pensions for state and local government retirees
from the IRS.25 At the time, the individual retirement systems reported payment of
pension benefits for each individual beneficiary annually to the IRS through Form
1099R - Distributions from Pensions, Annuities, Retirement or Profit-Sharing
254
Plans, IRAs, Insurance Contracts, etc.. By employing the IRS as a conduit for the
pertinent information, the proposal offered the significant advantage of avoiding the
administrative difficulties associated with obtaining the same information directly
from the individual retirement systems. However, the proposal suffered from two
drawbacks.25 First, as independent retirement systems filed Form 1099Rs annually,
the information would not have been as timely as that obtained directly through the
individual retirement systems.25 Additionally, Form 1099R required modification
to allow the SSA to distinguish noncovered pension payments from other categories
257of information reported on the form. Given the relative advantages and
disadvantages of each proposal, the General Accounting Office concluded that
obtaining the necessary information from the IRS would be "the most efficient and
least disruptive option" to improve administration of the WEP. In a letter
responding to the General Accounting Office report, Michael Dolan, the Deputy
Commissioner of the IRS, indicated that the IRS concurred with the report's
proposal, and could implement changes to form 1099R's reporting requirements for
219
the processing year 2000.
Responding to the General Accounting Office's report, the SSA implemented
postentitlement matching using data from the Office of Personnel Management to
verify the accuracy of information which federal retirees report.26 According to the
249. Id.
250. Id.




255. Id. at 14-15.
256. Id. at 13-14.
257. Id. at 15.
258. Id. at 16.
259. Id. at 28.
260. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 17, at 5-6 (2007).
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General Accounting Office, the postentitlement matching procedure has identified
beneficiaries for whom the SSA had failed to administer the WEP, and correction
of those errors will result in "hundreds of millions of dollars in savings."26 1 While
the SSA has implemented a measure to improve administration of the WEP for
federal retirees, the SSA to date has not developed an independent source to verify
262the accuracy of information provided by state and local government employees.
Although the IRS initially indicated that it could implement changes to form
1099R to facilitate reporting of state and local retirees' noncovered pension to the
Social SSA, the IRS subsequently determined that it could not implement the
263
procedure without a legislative mandate. In response, the U.S. General
Accountability Office issued reports in 2003, 2005, 2007, and 2011 urging
Congress to adopt legislation authorizing the IRS to gather needed information for
the effective administration of the WEP.264 To date, the only Congressional
response occurred when Congress was considering H.R. 743, the Social Security
Protection Act of 2004.265 During markup sessions on the bill, the Senate Finance
Committee added a provision to the bill that would have authorized the IRS to
266collect data on noncovered state and local government pensions. However,
Congress did not include this provision in the final version of the bill.26 The Office
of Management and Budget's Fiscal Year 2012 Budget of the U.S. Government
included a legislative proposal that would dedicate $50 million to developing an
"electronic mechanism" which would collect data from state and local government
retirement systems regarding retirees receiving noncovered pensions." The Office
of Management and Budget estimated that the legislative proposal, if enacted,
would have saved approximately $3.3 billion over ten years by improving the
SSA's ability to administer the WEP.269
An internal audit conducted by the SSA's Office of the Inspector General in
2011 determined that the SSA overpaid approximately 24,900 beneficiaries
approximately $623.8 million through April 2011 due to failure to administer the
WEP and Government Pension Offset (GPO) properly.270 While the audit included
261. Id. at 6.
262. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-I 1-318SP, OPPORTUNITIES To REDUCE POTENTIAL
DUPLICATION IN GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS, SAVE TAX DOLLARS, AND ENHANCE REVENUE 327 (2011).
263. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 17, at 6 (2003).
264. U.S GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-710T, Social Security: Issues Relating to
Noncoverage of Public Employees 9 (2003); U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-05-786T, SOCIAL
SECURITY: COVERAGE OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR REFORM 9 (2005); U.S. GOv'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 17, at 10; U.S GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO- ll-318SP,
OPPORTUNITIES TO REDUCE POTENTIAL DUPLICATION IN GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS, SAVE TAX DOLLARS,
AND ENHANCE REVENUE 328 (2011).
265. H.R. 743, 108th Cong. (2003).
266. S. REP. No. 108-176, at 21 (2003).
267. Social Security Protection Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-203, 118 Stat. 493.
268. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FISCAL YEAR 2012 BUDGET OF THE
U.S. GOVERNMENT: TERMINATIONS, REDUCTIONS, AND SAVINGS (2012).
269. Id. (noting that the total also includes savings from preventing GPO related overpayments).
270. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, A-13-10-10143, AUDIT
REPORT: OLD-AGE, SURVIVORS AND DISABILITY INSURANCE BENEFITS AFFECTED BY STATE OR LOCAL
GOVERNMENT PENSIONS at 6 (2011).
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data for both the WEP and the GPO, one can extrapolate the proportion of WEP
related overpayments from an earlier SSA report, which concluded that
approximately 62 percent of the overpaid dollars from 2005 through 2009 were
WEP related. 271' These overpayments occur because the SSA lacks sufficient
information regarding beneficiaries receiving noncovered state and local
government pensions to administer the WEP effectively and fairly.27 2 Any Social
Security overpayment due to the failure to apply the WEP is patently unfair to two
categories of beneficiaries: (1) beneficiaries who held Social Security covered
employment for 35 years and receive Social Security benefits pursuant to the
statutorily intended progressive benefit formula and (2) beneficiaries who receive
noncovered government pensions to whom the SSA applies the WEP. However,
because the SSA implemented a mechanism to improve WEP application in relation
to federal employees without implementing a similar mechanism to address state
and local employees, a disparity presently exists in the degree to which the SSA
273enforces the WEP against federal retirees, as compared to state and local retirees.
This disparity in application represents "yet another source of unfairness in the
calculation of Social Security benefits for public employees."27 4
C. Public Misperception and Resentment: SSA Efforts to Educate the Public
Beyond structural issues and the administrative challenges of enforcing the
WEP, the provision imposes a significant public relations problem. Congressional
testimony of those affected by the WEP demonstrates that public misperception and
resentment of the WEP is pervasive.27 Moreover, examples of hardship arising
from retirees' failure to account for the provision in their retirement plans appear
frequently.27 However, the problem is not merely one of public resentment towards
the government. As evidenced by the personal accounts of hardship, the underlying
issue is the quality of retirement that society seeks to ensure for the elderly. In
2010, Social Security benefits lifted approximately 14 million retirees above the
poverty line.27 Retirees increasingly rely on Social Security benefits for a greater
percentage of their post-retirement incomes, yet many workers approaching
retirement are unfamiliar with the mechanics of the Social Security benefits
formula.27 Too often, the result is personal hardship at a time when retirees are
least able to redress the situation.279 To humanize the issue, this Part begins by
providing examples of the personal hardship suffered by retirees who failed to
account for the WEP in their retirement plans. Next, this Part examines issues of
271. Id. at B-2.
272. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 17, at 6 (2007).
273. Id.
274. Id.
275. .See, Hearing: Penalty for Public Service, supra note 42; Hearing Before Subcomm. On Soc. Sec.,
Pensions, and Family Planning, supra note 1.
276. . ALLISON M. SHELTON, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE., 98-35, SOCIAL SECURITY: THE WINDFALL
ELIMINATION PROVISION (WEP). (2009).





public misperception and resentment, seeking to dispel the underlying
controversies. Finally, this Part explores the methods through which the SSA
attempts to communicate with the public regarding the WEP, identifying problems
in the SSA's framing of the WEP that may account for public misperceptions.
1. Accounts of Personal Hardship
Workers, lacking sufficient information about the WEP, often fail to account
for the effects of the provision in their retirement plans.28 Tragically, the result is
unanticipated hardship. In testimony before the Committee on Governmental
Affairs in 2003 and the Subcommittee on Social Security, Pensions, and Family
Policy in 2007, Senators, private parties, and organizations representing public
sector employees frequently cited examples of the hardship to retirees stemming
from failure to account for the WEP.21 The stories of Julia Worchester and Paul
McLaughlin are representative of the problem.
Julia Worchester held Social Security covered employment for 20 years during
28which time she worked as a waitress and in various positions at a factory.282
However, Julia dreamed of becoming a teacher, and at age 49, she enrolled in a
university program in pursuit of her goal.283 Thereafter, Julia taught full-time for 15
years, retiring at age 68.284 Approximately 4-5 years after beginning her teaching
career, Julia learned that the WEP would be fully applicable to her because she only
held Social Security covered employment for 20 years, resulting in a PIA of
$156. Worse yet for Julia, the 15 years during which she held a teaching position
were insufficient to qualify her for a full pension under her state's retirement
program.28 As a result, Julia received a combined monthly pension benefit of under
$800 per month ($9,600 annually).28 At the time of the hearing before the
Subcommittee on Social Security, Pensions, and Family Policy in 2007, Julia was
77 years old, and still working as a substitute teacher to make ends meet.28
Similarly, Paul McLaughlin began his working years in Social Security covered
employment by driving a taxicab and moving furniture during high school to earn
money for college.289 After finishing college, Paul taught for 31 years in a state that
permitted state and local government employees to pay into an alternative pension
program.290 However, during this period he also held part-time jobs in Social
280. ALLISON M. SHELTON, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE, 98-35, SOCIAL SECURITY: THE WINDFALL
ELIMINATION PROVISION (WEP) (2009).
281. Hearing: Penalty for Public Service, supra note 42, atl9-20, 22, 72, 73, 76, 78, 81; Hearing Before
Subcomm. On Soc. Sec., Pensions, and Family planning, supra note 1, at 5, 7, 11, 47-49, 121-129.
282. Hearing Before Subcomm. On Soc. Sec., Pensions, and Family planning, supra note 1, at 5.
283. Id.
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2911Security covered employment to supplement his income. Upon retiring in 2001,
Paul was shocked to learn he would not receive the PIA of $421 for which he
292
planned, but rather, a PIA of $187.10 due to application of the WEP. At 71 years
of age, Paul was still working a part-time job at the time of the hearing before the
Subcommittee on Social Security, Pensions, and Family Policy.293
In analyzing the structural problems of the WEP and administrative difficulties
inherent in enforcing the provision, it is easy for one to lose sight of the human
indignity of the problem. However, through recognition of the hardship that results
when a retiree mistakenly fails to account for the WEP, one can better understand
the public misperception and resentment surrounding the provision, as well as the
importance of the SSA's efforts to educate the public about the WEP.
2. Public Misperception and Resentment
The Social Security benefits formula is complex. Briefly stated, the formula
requires the SSA to (1) wage-index a worker's annual earnings,294 (2) average the
worker's 35 highest earning years to calculate AIME,295 and (3) derive PIA by
296
applying a progressive formula to AIME. Complicating the entire process, the
SSA must also wage-index a component of the progressive benefits formula - the
bendpoints - before it can even apply the formula to derive a worker's PIA. 9' In a
study to determine how well individuals can calculate the benefits to which they are
entitled, the Financial Literacy Center determined that one-quarter of participants in
the study overestimated benefits by more than 21 percent, and one-quarter
underestimated benefits by more than 22 percent.298 Given the complexity of the
formula, the Financial Literacy Center study suggested: "few Americans would be
capable of making these calculations even if they had a computer spreadsheet
,,299program. In this context, the WEP adds a layer of complexity to the entire
process. The WEP requires a complex, involved calculation an understanding of
which requires thorough knowledge of the policy behind the Social Security
benefits formula. Given the overall complexity of the Social Security benefits
formula and the WEP, public misperception and resentment of the provision are not
surprising.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 49
293. Id.
294. 42 U.S.C. § 415(b)(3)(A) (2006).
295. 42 U.S.C. § 415(b)(1), (b)(1)(A), (b)(2)(A)(i), (b)(2)(B)(i).
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a. The Myth of a Stolen Entitlement
Parsing Congressional testimony proffered both by Senators and individuals to
whom the WEP applies, one can find numerous examples of misperceptions of the
WEP and Social Security benefits policy in general.300 For example, during a 2003
hearing before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, Senator Collins observed:
"what is so frustrating to teachers and firefighters and police officers who have paid
in personally into the system, worked for 10 years in the private sector, [is that
they] earned their benefits and can't get the benefit.', 30 ' The same sentiment
expressed by a retiree during a hearing four years later before the Subcommittee on
302Social Security, Pensions, and Family Policy elicited applause from the audience.
On one hand, this perception of an injustice is correct to the extent a fundamental
tenant of the Social Security system is that benefits are an "earned right."303
However, the magnitude of the entitlement depends on contributions to the Social
304
Security system. Upon paying into the Social Security system for 40 quarters (10
years), a worker becomes eligible to receive Social Security benefits.30 While the
minimum criteria for eligibility is 40 quarters of sufficient earnings in covered
employment," the Social Security benefits formula bases PIA on a worker's
highest 35 years of annual wage-indexed earnings.307 Moreover, the formula
actually considers 40 years30 during which both the worker (in Social Security
covered employment) and her employer pay Federal Insurance Contribution Act
(FICA) taxes (6.2 percent of earnings up to the employee's maximum taxable
earnings for the OASDI program).309 Thus, the WEP does not seek to deprive
affected beneficiaries of an earned right, but rather, attempts to measure benefits
according to the amount of the entitlement earned.
b. The Myth ofDiscriminatory Treatment ofPublic Servants
Another frequent concern evidenced by Congressional testimony of individuals
to whom the WEP applies is that the WEP discriminates against federal, state, and
local government employees or penalizes workers for their decisions to pursue a
public sector career."o For example, Elbert Bade, a retired teacher explained:
"Teaching's [sic] a great career and very satisfying but no one tells you they're
300. See, Hearing: Penalty for Public Service, supra note 42; Hearing Before Subcomm. On Soc. Sec.,
Pensions, and Family planning, supra note 1.
301. Hearing: Penaltyfor Public Service, supra note 42, at 14.
302. Hearing Before Subcomm. On Soc. Sec., Pensions, and Family planning, supra note 1, at 21.
303. Hearing: Penalty for Public Service, supra note 42, at 13.
304. Id.
305. 42 U.S.C. § 414(a)(2) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 413(a)(2)(A)(ii) (2006).
306. Id.
307. 42 U.S.C. § 415(b)(1)(A), (b)(2)(A)(i), (b)(2)(B)(i) (2006).
308. 42 U.S.C. § 415(b)(1)(A).
309. 26 U.S.C § 3 101(a) (2010); 26 U.S.C. § 3111(a) (2011).
310. See, Hearing: Penalty for Public Service, supra note 42; Hearing Before Subcomm. On Soc. Sec.,
Pensions, and Family planning, supra note 1.
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going to jerk your Social Security because you were a teacher.""' Similarly, Joan
Piacquadio, a retired school nurse, observed: "Ordinarily people who don't work in
the public sector don't have any idea how public employees are treated. . . We are
treated like second-class citizens."3 12 In fact, the title for the hearing before the
Committee on Governmental Affairs itself questions, without answering, whether
the WEP unfairly discriminates against employees and retirees.!13 Underlying these
views are two concerns: (1) The WEP is discriminatory because it does not require
reduction of Social Security benefits for beneficiaries who receive private
pensions314 and (2) by penalizing public sector employees, who generally receive
low salaries, the WEP provides a disincentive to work in important fields such as
teaching or law enforcement.3s
Whether the WEP is discriminatory or penalizes public sector employees are
complex issues. For example, suggestions that the WEP imposes a penalty on
public sector employees are fraught with the same misperceptions as arguments that
the WEP deprives beneficiaries of an earned right. Congress enacted the WEP to
address the 'windfall' benefits that accrue to workers with short careers in Social
Security covered employment.316 To the extent that the WEP adjusts a retiree's
benefits to reflect contributions paid, the WEP does not actually impose a penalty,
but rather, restores the progressivity of the Social Security benefits formula.
However, the decision to reduce the percentage factor applicable to the first bracket
of AIME from 90 percent to 40 percent was the product of Congressional
compromise."' As the WEP represents an imprecise solution to a complex problem,
the provision does have a disproportionate impact on low-income workers."' In this
sense, one can view the WEP as imposing a penalty; for example, low-income
workers who held noncovered employment receive replacement rates below that of
their counterparts with similar earnings who only held covered employment." 9
Similarly, the WEP does not discriminate on the basis of public sector
employment. Rather, the WEP targets public sector employees who pay into
alternative government pension programs in lieu of contributing to the Social
Security system.320 As the Second Circuit observed, government employers provide
alternative retirement programs to substitute both for Social Security benefits and
private pensions.321 Thus, the Second Circuit upheld application of the WEP to a
beneficiary against an Equal Protection Clause challenge, finding that the provision
is rationally related to the legitimate government purpose of preventing 'windfall'
311. Hearing Before Subcomm. On Soc. Sec., Pensions, and Family planning, supra note 1, at 84.
312. Id. at 49.
313. Penalty for Public Service: Do the Social Security Government Pension Offset and Windfall
Elimination Provision Unfairly Discriminate Against Employees and Retirees?: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
On Gov't Affairs, 108th Cong. (2003).
314. Hearing Before Subcomm. On Soc. Sec., Pensions, and Family planning, supra note 1, at 10.
315. Hearing: Penalty for Public Service, supra note 42, at 4.
316. See Discussion supra Part 2.E: Towards Enactment of the WEP.
317. Id.
318. See Discussion supra Part 3.A Disproportionate Impact.
319. Id.
320. 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(7)(B)(ii).
321. Rudykoff v. Apfel, 193 F.3d 579, 581 (2nd Cir. 1999).
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benefits from accruing to individuals with short careers in Social Security covered
employment.32 Nevertheless, given the previously discussed deficiencies of the
WEP, one might argue that the provision is discriminatory for two reasons: (1) the
323
provision has a disproportionate impact on low-income workers and (2) a
disparity presently exists in the degree to which the SSA enforces the WEP against
324
federal retirees, as compared to state and local retirees.
C. The Myth ofa Benefits Reduction
The public's impression that the WEP is discriminatory, imposes a penalty, and
deprives workers of an earned right suggests a final, and entirely too common,
misperception - the notion that the WEP reduces a worker's benefits.325 As
previously discussed, the WEP attempts to adjust a worker's Social Security
benefits to reflect the worker's contribution to the Social Security system.326 As
such, the WEP does not reduce benefits, at least theoretically, but rather, prevents
workers with short careers in Social Security covered employment from receiving
'windfall' benefits above their statutorily intended PIA.32 Of course, the WEP is an
imprecise mechanism, which affords low-income workers a replacement rate below
that of their counterparts who only held Social Security covered employment,
thereby resulting in a benefits reduction.
3. SSA Efforts to Communicate with the Public Regarding the WEP
Given the complexity of the Social Security benefits formula and the WEP, the
hardship that arises when a retiree fails to account for the WEP's effects, and the
issues of public misconception, one may wonder how the SSA approaches
explaining the provision to beneficiaries to whom the WEP applies. One
mechanism that the SSA employs to provide workers with information about the
Social Security benefits formula, as well as the WEP, is the Social Security
Statement.329 On December 19, 1989, Congress enacted the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1989, requiring the SSA to furnish upon request Social
Security Account Statements to eligible individuals, defined as Social Security
account number holders who have attained the age of 25.330 Moreover, the provision
required the SSA to furnish such a statement, automatically on a biennial basis, to
322. Id.
323. See Discussion supra Part 3.A: Disproportionate Impact.
324. See Discussion supra Part 3.B: The SSA Has Insufficient Information to Apply the WEP to All of the
Targeted Beneficiaries.
325. See generally, Hearing: Penalty for Public Service, supra note 42; Hearing Before Subcomm. On
Soc. Sec., Pensions, and Family planning, supra note 1.
326. See Discussion infra Part 2.E: Towards Enactment of the WEP.
327. Id.
328. See Discussion infra Part 3.A: Disproportionate Impact.
329. U.S Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-I 1-787T, Social Security Statements: Observations on
SSA's Plans for the Social Security Statement 1, 6 (2007); The Social Security Protection Act of 2004, PUB
L.No. 108-203, 118 Stat. 493.
330. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, PUB L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106.
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all eligible individuals for whom the SSA could determine a mailing address."' The
Act required the SSA to include basic information such as the eligible individual's
annual wages, contributions made, and an estimate of the individual's future PIA."'
In calendar year 1995, pursuant to the Act, the SSA began mailing the Social
Security Statement to individuals who had attained age 60 by October 1, 1994."'
Thereafter, the SSA phased-in increasingly younger cohorts furnishing the Social
Security Statement to all eligible individuals by October 1, 1999.334
During the phase-in period, the Social Security Advisory Board released a
report in 1997, concluding that the public had an incomplete understanding of the
Social Security system, and that the public lacked sufficient knowledge of benefits
under the system and the requirements for eligibility."' Moreover, the Report
determined that the SSA had a responsibility to help both workers and retirees
understand how to provide for their economic security in retirement.' The Social
Security Advisory Board determined that the Social Security Statement must
"receive the most careful, high level attention with respect to content and design"
because the Statement would become the SSA's "most important means of
communicating with the public." 33 7 Responding to the Advisory Board's Report, the
SSA shortened the length of the Social Security Statement and improved its
organization and readability; however, a follow-up review in 2000 concluded that
the Statement's explanation of benefits remained a concern.m The final step in the
evolution of the Social Security Statement arrived on March 2, 2004, when
Congress enacted the Social Security Protection Act of 2004, which required the
SSA to include in the statement, "an explanation, in language calculated to be
understood by the average eligible individual, of the operation of the... [WEP]...
and an explanation of the maximum potential effects of such provision[] on the
eligible individual's. . . benefits." 9
Presently the Social Security Statement serves as the SSA's primary means of
conveying information to approximately 150 million workers regarding their
benefits.340 Responding to the statutory mandate to provide an explanation that can
be understood by the average eligible individual, the Social Security Statement
provides the following explanation of the WEP:
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In the future, if you receive a pension from employment in which you do
not pay Social Security taxes, such as some federal, state, or local
government work... and you also qualify for your own Social Security
retirement or disability benefit, your Social Security benefit may be
reduced, but not eliminated by WEP. The amount of reduction, if any,
depends on your earnings and number of years in jobs in which you paid
Social Security taxes, and the year you are age 62 or become disabled.
For more information, please see. .. www.socialsecurity.gov/WEP.34 1
In considering how the public forms misperceptions of the WEP, several points
regarding the statement are of note. To begin, the statement probably leaves a
potentially affected beneficiary asking a very simple question - "Why?" Only upon
taking further affirmative action can a beneficiary learn more about the WEP. Also
of note, the statement explicitly frames the adjustment to benefits as a reduction,
and the statement's method of estimating a worker's potential Social Security
benefits only reinforces this framing. In estimating future benefits, the statement
looks to the worker's past covered earnings, and future annual earnings based on
the average of the worker's annual salary during the two years preceding issuance
of the statement.3 42 Accordingly, the Statement does not apply the WEP to workers
who have periods of noncovered employment, but rather, indicates that the WEP
may reduce the worker's estimated benefit.3 43 Another point of concern, the
statement associates the benefit reduction with the beneficiary's alternative
government pension. Finally, the Statement does not respond to the statutory
mandate to provide a clear statement of the maximum possible effects of the WEP.
Where an individual takes the affirmative step of seeking additional
information from the website that the Social Security Statement references, she will
find material that further compounds the potential for misperception. The very first
heading on the webpage reads, "Your Social Security retirement or disability
benefits may be reduced."344 Under the heading, a potentially effected beneficiary
will learn that if she worked for a government employer that did not withhold
Social Security taxes, "the pension you get based on that work may reduce your
Social Security benefits."3 45 Hence, rather than explaining to the reader that the
WEP adjusts benefits to reflect contributions, the website likely produces the
impression that the WEP reduces benefits because the reader also receives an
alternative government pension. From there, the logical question is why the WEP
does not apply to individuals receiving private pensions. When the reader proceeds
to the heading "Why a different formula is used," she obtains a brief explanation of
341. Id. at 19.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. Windfall Elimination Provision: Your Social Security Retirement or Disability Benefits May Be
Affected, SOCIALSECURITY.GOv, http://www.socialsecurity.gov/pubs/I0045.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2012).
345. Id.
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the progressivity of Social Security benefits.346 Additionally, the page provides the
following:
Before 1983, people who worked mainly in a job not covered by Social
Security had their Social Security benefits calculated as if they were
long-term, low-wage workers. They had the advantage of receiving a
Social Security benefit representing a higher percentage of their earnings,
plus a pension from a job where they did not pay Social Security taxes.
Congress passed the Windfall Elimination Provision to remove that
advantage.347
The explanation, particularly the second sentence, reads more as a criticism
than an explanation calculated to be understood by the average beneficiary.
Although the explanation does describe in basic terms the effect of noncovered
employment on a worker's PIA, the description does not offer any clarification as
to how the issue actually arises. Moreover, workers perceiving themselves to be
low-income workers may still wonder why the provision applies in their situation.
While the underlying rationale for the WEP is highly complex, the SSA could
demonstrate the rationale through examples - particularly if the examples relate
contributions made to benefits paid for covered and noncovered workers (with and
without the WEP).
Besides mandating provision of Social Security Statements to eligible
individuals, the Social Security Protection Act of 2004 also required state and local
government employers to provide workers hired in noncovered positions after
January 1, 2005 written notice of the maximum effect of the WEP on the worker's
future PIA.34 The Act requires the written notice to be in a form proscribed by the
349
Commissioner of Social Security and transparent to the average individual.
Accordingly, the SSA instructs state and local government employers to provide
eligible workers with Form SSA-1945, which provides the following description of
the WEP:
Under the Windfall Elimination Provision, your Social Security
retirement or disability benefit is figured using a modified formula when
you are also entitled to a pension from a job where you did not pay Social
Security tax. As a result, you will receive a lower Social Security benefit
than if you were not entitled to a pension form this job. For example, if
you are age 62 in 2005, the maximum monthly reduction in your Social
Security benefit as a result of this provision is $313.50. This amount is
updated annually. This provision reduces, but does not totally eliminate,
346. Windfall Elimination Provision: Why a Different Formula is Used, SOCIALSECURITY.GOV,
http://www.socialsecurity.gov/pubs/10045.htmi (last visited Feb. 19, 2012).
347. Id.




your Social Security benefit. For additional information, please refer to
Social Security Publication, 'Windfall Elimination Provision.,"', 0
Although Form SSA-1945 certainly meets the statutory requirement of providing an
understandable description of the WEP's maximum benefit reduction, the Form,
like the Social Security Statement, can foster misperceptions. For example, the
form frames the WEP as a reduction to benefits, links the reduction to a government
pension, and fails to provide any explanation as to why the WEP is necessary.
At a time when soon-to-be retirees are making the most important financial
decisions of their lives, the SSA generally does not furnish case specific advice."'
Instead, in planning for retirement, individuals must educate themselves about the
operation of the Social Security benefits formula, the impact of decisions including
when to retire, and whether and to what extent provisions such as the WEP are
applicable.35 Nevertheless, despite the deficiencies in the Social Security Statement
and Form SSA-1945, these documents represent an important milestone in a
potentially effected beneficiary's efforts to plan for retirement. For an individual
who commenced noncovered employment after January 1, 2005, Form SSA- 1945353
will likely be the first occasion on which the individual learns of the WEP. Hence,
the document should provide an impetus for the individual to take affirmative
action to learn more about the WEP, and to consider whether noncovered
employment represents the best career decision. Workers who commenced
noncovered employment prior to January 1, 2005,354 generally did not have the
same opportunity to make an informed decision regarding future employment. For
these individuals, the Social Security Statement serves an even more important
purpose, as the document provides the first instance in which a worker, potentially
on the verge of retirement, likely will learn about the WEP. Moreover, the
document provides an annual reminder to individuals who did receive Form SSA-
1945.
In this context, it is not surprising that the Social Security Advisory Board
would refer to the Social Security Statement as the "most direct and important
means of communicating with the public."" Given the importance of the
Statement, the surprise is that as late as 2009, the Social Security Advisory Board
found that the Statement's language was too bureaucratic and confusing.35
Moreover, the report suggested that if a potentially effected beneficiary even recalls
350. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, Form SSA-1945 Statement Concerning Your Employment in a
Job Not Covered by Social Security, SSA.Gov, http://www.ssa.gov/online/ssa-1945.pdf (last visited February
20, 2012).
351. . Jennie L. Phipps, 7 Little-Known Social Security Benefits, BANKRATE.COM,
http://www.bankrate.com/finance/retirement/7-social-security-benefits.aspx?ec-id=mI078090#slide=1 (last
visited Mar. 9, 2012).
352. .Id.
353. . The Social Security Protection Act of 2004, PuB L. No. 108-203, 118 Stat. 493.
354. . Id.
355.. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, SOCIAL SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD, INCREASING PUBLIC
UNDERSTANDING OF SOCIAL SECURITY 1 (2009).
356. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, SOCIAL SECURITY ADVISORY BOARD, INCREASING PUBLIC
UNDERSTANDING OF SOCIAL SECURITY 15 (2009).
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reading the excerpt on the WEP, the individual may not be able to discern the
meaning of important information contained therein - for example, whether the
provision applies in the individual's situation."'
IV. LEGISLATIVE ACTION
Since enactment of the WEP in 1983, legislators have introduced numerous
bills before Congress to modify, replace, or repeal the controversial provision - by
the author's' count, 39 bills and 2 resolutions."' Of the 39 bills, the earliest five
bills - H.R. 11, H.R. 2141, H.R. 2264, and H.R. 4277 - addressed exclusion of
military reservists' benefits and totalization benefits from application of the WEP.m"'
These bills are irrelevant for purposes of the present discussion, as they do not
relate to the presently existing disadvantages of the WEP, moreover, the
amendments proposed became law in 1994."0 The remaining 35 bills are generally
duplicative, as the total includes companion bills from the House of Representatives
and the Senate, as well as bills that have been reintroduced year after year.
However, the 35 bills represent four distinct legislative proposals: (1) the Social
Security Fairness Act, (2) the WEP Relief Act (2004 and later), (3) the WEP
Relief Act (pre-2004),36 and (4) the Public Servant Retirement Protection Act.364
357. Id.
358. H.R. 1332, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R.2797, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 113, ll2th Cong. (2011); S. 113,
112th Cong. (2011); S. 2010, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 235, 11Ith Cong. (2009); H.R. 1221, 111th Cong.
(2009); H.R. 2145, 11Ith Cong. (2009); S. 490, 11Ith Cong. (2009); S. 484, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 82,
110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 726, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 2772, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 206, 110th Cong.
(2007); S. 1647, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 147, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 1690, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R.
1714, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. Res. 987, 109'h Cong. (2006); S. 619, 109th Cong. (2005); S. 866, 109th
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(2001); H.R. 2638, 107th Cong. (2001); S. 1523, 107th Cong. (2001); S. 2521, 107th Cong. (2002); H.R. 860,
106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 2549, 105th Cong. (1997); H.R. 922, 103d Cong. (1993); H.R. 2141, 103d Cong.
(1993); H.R. 2264, 103d Cong. (1993); H.R. 4277, 103d Cong. (1994); H.R. 11, 102d Cong. (1992).
359. H.R. 922, 103d Cong. (1993); H.R. 2141, 103d Cong. (1993); H.R. 2264, 103d Cong. (1993); H.R.
4277, 103d Cong. (1994); H.R. 11, 102d Cong. (1992).
360. Social Security Independence and Program Improvements Act of 1994, PUB. L. No. 103-296, 108
Stat. 1464.
361. H.R. 1332, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 2010, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 235, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 484,
11Ith Cong. (2009); H.R. 82, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 206, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 147, 109th Cong. (2005);
S. 619, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 594, 108h Cong. (2003); S. 349, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 2638, 107th
Cong. (2001); S. 1523, 107th Cong. (2001).
362. H.R. 2145, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 726, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1690, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R.
4234, 108th Cong. (2004).
363. H.R. 2011, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 1011, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 1073, 107th Cong. (2001); S.
2521, 107th Cong. (2002); H.R. 860, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 2549, 105th Cong. (1997).
364. H.R. 2797, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 113, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 1221, 11Ith Cong. (2009); S. 490,
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A. The Social Security Fairness Act
Among the various proposals addressing the WEP, the Social Security Fairness
Acts (SSFA) has traditionally received the most support in Congress. First
introduced by Senator Feinstein and Representative McKeon in 2001 before
Congress," the bill has been reintroduced by Senator Feinstein in the Senate, and
Representatives McKeon or Berman in the House, during every succeeding
Congress.17 The most recent iteration of the bill - the SSFA of 2013 - is before the
House as H.R. 1795 and the Senate as S. 896. If passed, H.R. 1795 and S. 896
would repeal the WEP allowing beneficiaries who held both covered and
noncovered employment to receive Social Security benefits based on the Social
Security benefits formula beginning in January 2014.369
Support for the SSFA has fluctuated from 2001 to 2013; however, two patterns
are evident from an examination of the bills cosponsors in the House of
Representatives: (1) strong Democratic support and (2) strong backing from states
in which noncovered workers are concentrated. To begin, when first introduced in
2001, the Social Security Fairness Act received 185 cosponsors in the House of
Representatives.370 By the 110th Congress, 337 cosponsors signed onto the bill,7
but support has subsequently declined to 149 cosponsors in the House during the
112 Congress.37 While overall support for the bill has fluctuated, Democrats have
consistently accounted for between 60 and 70 percent of the bills' cosponsors.
Similarly, representatives from California, Colorado, Illinois, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Ohio, and Texas - the seven states in which 70 percent of
noncovered state and local government employees are concentrated3 74 - have
consistently provided strong backing for the SSFA. For example, when
Representative McKeon first introduced the bill in 2001, 51 percent of the bill's
cosponsors were representatives of the above listed states. 37 Support for the SSFA
was more evenly distributed between states in subsequent Congresses; however, the
365. Compare H.R. 82, 110th Cong. (2007) (the iteration of the Social Security Fairness Act to receive the
most co-sponsors), with H.R. 2011, 108th Cong. (2003) (the iteration of the WEP Relief Act to receive the
most co-sponsors), and H.R. 1714, 109th Cong. (2005) (the iteration of the Public Servant Retirement
Protection Act to receive the most co-sponsors).
366. H.R. 2638, 107th Cong. (2001); S. 1593, 107th Cong. (2001).
367. H.R. 1332, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 2010, 112th Cong. (2011). H.R. 235, 11Ith Cong. (2009); S. 484,
111 th Cong. (2009); H.R. 82, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 206, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 147, 109th Cong. (2005);
S. 619, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 594, 108 Cong. (2003); S. 349, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 2638, 107th
Cong. (2001); S. 1523, 107th Cong. (2001).
368. H.R. 1795, 113 Cong. (2013), S. 896, 113h Cong. (2013).
369. Id.
370. H.R. 2638, 107th Cong. (2001).
371. H.R. 82, 110th Cong. (2008).
372. H.R. 1332, 112th Cong. (2011).
373. H.R. 1332, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 235, 11Ith Cong. (2009); H.R. 82, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R.
147, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 594, 108 Cong. (2003); H.R. 2638, 107th Cong. (2001).
374. U.S GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 17, at 4.
375. H.R. 2638, 107th Cong. (2001).
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seven states continued to account for between 34 and 42 percent of the cosponsors
for the bill.376
Similarly, support for the SSFA has fluctuated in the Senate.17' When Senator
Feinstein first introduced the S. 1523 in 2001, 14 Senators cosponsored the bill."'
Subsequently, support for the bill peaked in 2007 with 36 Senators cosponsoring
the bill,37 ' and fell to a low in 2011 when nine Senators cosponsored the bill.3"o As
in the House, the SSFA receives considerable Democratic support in the Senate,
ranging from 69 to 84 percent of total cosponsors. Support from Senators
representing the seven above listed states has ranged from 11 percent to 36 percent
382of the bills' cosponsors.
Although the House and Senate always referred the bills to the House Ways
and Means Committee and the Senate Committee on Finance, the bills consistently
383
died in committee.
While the SSFA has garnered considerable support in Congress, a prudent
balancing of the bill's advantages and disadvantages cautions against repealing the
384WEP. Beneficiaries to whom the WEP applies are a vocal group. As such, the
SSFA is doubtless a politically popular bill - particularly in California, Colorado,
Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Ohio, and Texas where benefits will increase,
immediately or in the future, for approximately 4.7 million state and local
government employees if Congress passes the bill. Moreover, by repealing the
386WEP, the SSFA would directly address all of the disadvantages of the provision.
On the other hand, repealing the WEP would impose significant costs at a time
when the Social Security system is already facing long-term financial challenges.387
Specifically, the SSA, in a 2007 estimate, indicated that repeal of the WEP would
cost approximately $40.1 billion over ten years, and increase the Social Security
376. H.R. 1332, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 235, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 82, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R.
147, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 594, 108' Cong. (2003).
377. S. 2010, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 484, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 206, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 619, 109th
Cong. (2005); S. 349, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 1523, 107th Cong. (2001).
378. S. 1523, 107th Cong. (2001).
379. S. 206, 110th Cong. (2007).
380. S. 2010, 112th Cong. (2011).
381. S. 2010, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 484, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 206, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 619, 109th
Cong. (2005); S. 349, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 1523, 107th Cong. (2001).
382. Id.
383. See generally, Bill Tracking Report, PROQUEST CONGRESSIONAL, http://web.lexis-
nexis.com.ezproxy.1ibrary.unlv.edu/congcomp (last visited Feb. 25, 2012).
384. Hearing: Penalty for Public Service, supra note 42, at 13 (In her testimony, Senator Collins mentions
that she receives letters regarding the WEP in the constituent Mail). Id. 4. (In his testimony, the President of
the National Association of Retired Federal Employees indicates that the organization has received thousands
of letters from members since the bill was enacted) Id. In response to Congressional Hearings in 2003 and
2005, dozens of affected beneficiaries submitted letters for the Congressional record describing stories of
hardship stemming from the WEP). See generally, U.S GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 17.
385. U.S Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 17, at 1, 3, 4 (providing that 6.8 million state and
local government employees work in noncovered employment and that 70 percent of those workers are
concentrated in the seven listed states).
386. See infra, Disadvantages of the WEP.
387. U.S Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 17, at 8.
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system's long-range deficit by roughly 3 percent.8 Additionally, repeal of the WEP
would raise considerable concerns regarding the fairness of the Social Security
benefits formula for private sector employees when compared to federal, state, and
local government employees.8 9 Congress enacted the WEP to address the 'windfall'
benefits that accrue to workers with short careers in Social Security covered
employment.! Permitting noncovered government employees to receive benefits
above the statutorily intended replacement rates would run counter to the
fundamental tenants of the Social Security system - progressivity of benefits that
are an earned right.39' Moreover, many of the arguments against the WEP could just
as easily apply to the Social Security benefits formula absent the WEP. For
example, if the Social Security benefits formula permits noncovered government
workers to receive 'windfall' benefits, one could argue that the formula has a
disproportionate impact on workers who only held covered employment.
B. The WEP ReliefAct
Representative Frank was the first Congressional representative to undertake a
formal effort to modify the WEP, introducing H.R. 2549 in 1997.392 At the time, the
bill was unnamed, but Representative Frank subsequently entitled a modified
version of the bill, which he first introduced in 2004, the WEP Relief Act
(WEPRA).393 Between the two versions of the bill, Representative Frank introduced
the bill in the House eight times between 1997 and 2009.394 Senator Kerry
introduced the companion bill for the early version of the WEPRA in the Senate
twice in 2002 and 2003; the later version of the bill has not appeared before the
Senate.!
Representative Frank's early version of the WEPRA would have amended the
Social Security Act by restricting application of the WEP to individuals receiving
combined monthly benefits (including both Social Security benefits and benefits
received through a noncovered government pension) in excess of $2,000.396 For
individuals receiving combined monthly benefits exceeding $2,000, the bill would
have required the SSA to derive two values (1) the individual's PIA using the
traditional formula and (2) the individuals PIA (according to the traditional
formula) minus one-half the value of the worker's noncovered monthly pension
388. ALLISON M. SHELTON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 98-35, SOCIAL SECURITY: THE WINDFALL
ELIMINATION PROVISION (WEP) 7 (2010).
389. U.S GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 17, at 8.
390. See infra, Toward Enactment of the WEP.
391. See infra, Social Security: Purpose and Principles/
392. H.R. 2549, 105th Cong. (1997).
393. H.R 4253, 108th Cong. (2004).
394. H.R. 2145, 1I lb Cong. (2009); H.R. 726, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1690, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R.
4234, 108th Cong. (2004); H.R. 2011, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 1073, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R 860; 106th
Cong. (1999); H.R. 2549, 105th Cong. (1997).
395. S. 1011, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 2521, 107th Cong. (2002).
396. 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 1073, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R 860; 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 2549, 105th
Cong. (1997).
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benefit."' The bill would have then instructed the SSA to reduce the greater of the
two amounts derived in the previous step by applying a percentage factor to the
amount in excess of $2,000 to arrive at the individual's PIA.39 The bill provided for
a phasing-in of the applicable percentage factor for individuals receiving combined
monthly benefits between $2,000 and $3,000. For combined benefits exceeding
$2,000 but less than $2,250, the applicable percentage factor was 20 percent.399
Thereafter, the percentage factor increased by 20 percent for every additional $250
of combined monthly benefits until reaching 100 percent (or a total reduction of the
amount in excess of $2,000) at or over $3,000.0 If Congress had enacted the
WEPRA, the bill would have required the SSA to recompute workers' PIAs to the
extent necessary to carry out the provisions of the bill.401
The later version of the WEPRA would have operated to achieve a similar
result; however, the bill included notable difference as compared to its
predecessor.40 First, the bill would have restricted application of the WEP to
individuals receiving combined monthly benefits exceeding $2,500. Similar to the
earlier version of the bill, the modified WEPRA would have instructed the SSA to
calculate two values for individuals with combined monthly benefits in excess of
$2,500: (1) the individual's PIA determined through the traditional formula and (2)
the same amount reduced by one-half the value of the worker's non-covered
government pension.403 To the greater of the two amounts, the bill would have
required the SSA to apply a percentage factor to the amount in excess of $2,500,
thereby reducing the individual's PIA.404 The modified version of the WEPRA
provided for a phasing-in of the WEP between $2,501 and $3,334, employing a
complex formula that reduces the benefit amount in excess of $2,500 by 10 percent
for every additional $83.33.405 Notably, the modified version of the WEPRA
included a provision that if enacted would have adjusted the threshold for
application of the WEP, as well as the amounts through which the WEP would have
phased-in, for changes in the national average wage index.406 As with the previous
version of the bill, the modified WEPRA would have required the SSA to
417
recompute workers' PIAs to carry out the provisions of the bill.
408
Support for the WEPRA has fluctuated considerably from 1997 to 2009.
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408. H.R. 2145, I11 Cong. (2009); H.R. 726, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1690, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R.
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representative cosponsoring H.R. 2145 during in 2009 to 232 representatives
cosponsoring H.R. 1073 in 2001.9 In general, the early version of the WEPRA -
the version that excluded a wage-indexing provision - received far greater support
than the more recent iteration of the bill.41 Similar to the SSFA, the WEPRA has
411
consistently received strong Democratic support. In fact, Democrats have
comprised between 78 percent and 100 percent of the total cosponsors for each bill
before the House. In contrast to both the SSFA and the Public Servant Retirement
Protection Act (discussed below), the WEPRA has not received considerable
support in the House from representatives of the seven states in which 70 percent of
noncovered state and local employees are concentrated - California, Colorado,
Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Ohio, and Texas.41 Generally, representative of
these seven states have accounted for between 25 and 35 percent of the bill's
cosponsors in the House. 4 13 However, this pattern does have three exceptions:
representatives of the seven states accounted for (1) 0 percent of the cosponsors for
H.R. 2145 (2009),414 (2) 43 percent of the cosponsors for H.R. 2549 (1997),415 and
411(3) 80 percent of the cosponsors for H.R. 4234(2004). In the Senate, S. 1011 and
S. 2521 received five and three cosponsors respectively, each of whom were
Democrats, and none of whom hailed from one of the above listed states.417 On each
occasion that the WEPRA has appeared before Congress, the bills have died in the
House Committee on Ways and Means or the Senate Finance Committee. 418
As with the SSFA, the WEPRA has both advantages and disadvantages. For
example, the bill responds directly to concerns regarding the disproportionate
impact of the WEP on low-income workers419 by exempting from the WEP
individuals with combined monthly benefits falling below $2,500 ($2,000 under the
Cong. (2002); H.R. 1073, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R 860; 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 2549, 105th Cong. (1997).
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Cong. (1999); H.R. 2549, 105th Cong. (1997); U.S Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 17, at 4.
413. H.R. 2145, 111 Cong. (2009); H.R. 726, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1690, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R.
4234, 108th Cong. (2004); H.R. 2011, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 1073, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R 860; 106th
Cong. (1999); H.R. 2549, 105th Cong. (1997).
414. H.R. 2145, 111 Cong. (2009);
415. H.R. 2549, 105th Cong. (1997).
416. H.R. 4234, 108th Cong. (2004).
417. S. 1011, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 2521, 107th Cong. (2002).
418. See generally, Bill Tracking Report, PROQUEST CONGRESSIONAL, http://web.lexis-
nexis.com.ezproxy.library.unlv.edu/congcomp (last visited Feb. 25, 2012).
419. See Discussion supra Part 3: WEP: The Problems.
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early version of the bill).42 Although eliminating the WEP's disproportionate
impact represents a laudable goal, the bill would achieve this by permitting many
421workers to receive the 'windfall' benefits that gave rise to the WEP. Consider a
low-income worker who held noncovered employment for 15 years, earning
$20,000 annually, thereby qualifying for an $800 monthly pension benefit under her
state retirement program. Subsequently, the worker returned to school, earned a law
degree, and obtained a job in Social Security covered employment for which she
received maximum taxable earnings for each of the subsequent 20 years. Under the
WEPRA, if the worker attains early retirement age in 2012 and elects to defer
retirement until full retirement age, the worker will receive a PIA of $1,933.70 ((.9
* $767) + (.32 * ($4,624-$767)) + (.15 * ($4,685.10 - $4,624))). As the combined
total of the worker's Social Security benefits and noncovered pension ($2,350.20)
does not exceed $2,500, the WEP would not be applicable to the worker under the
WEPRA. Had all of the worker's earnings been in Social Security covered
employment, the worker would have received a PIA of $2,040.80 ((.9 * $767) +
(.32 * ($4,624-$767)) + (.15 * ($5,399.40 - $4,624))). In this example, under the
WEPRA, the worker received a replacement rate of 41 percent ($1,933.70 /
$4,685.10) * 100). By contrast, if all of the worker's earnings had been in Social
Security covered employment, the worker would have received a replacement rate
of 37 percent ($2,040.80 / $5,399.40) * 100). Thus, the worker receives both the
benefit of a replacement rate that is higher than statutorily intended, and a pension
from noncovered employment.
While the above hypothetical is an isolated example, it demonstrates that under
the WEPRA, whether 'windfall' benefits will accrue to workers is highly dependent
on the size of the worker's noncovered government pension. In this sense, one
might argue that the bill embodies one of the underlying principles of the Social
Security benefits formula - progressivity of benefits. While there will be examples
of workers with significant earnings receiving 'windfall' benefits under the bill, the
bill is more permissive of such benefits accruing to workers with smaller total
combined benefits - that is, the workers who may benefit most from the 'windfall.'
While the above consideration represent a difficult policy debate, several other
concerns weigh against the bill. For example, the bill does apply a modified
version of the WEP to the portion of combined benefits exceeding $2,500.
However, the bill fails to implement a system through which the SSA can collect
data on state and local government retirees receiving noncovered pensions. Thus,
the bill would permit the modified version of the WEP to apply to federal retirees to
a greater degree than it would apply to state and local government retirees.
Additionally, under the bill, the manner in which the SSA addresses the 'windfall'
benefits problem would remain highly complex. Without further action by the SSA,
issues of public misperception and resentment would likely remain.
420. H.R. 2145, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 726, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1690, 109th Cong. (2005); HR.
4234, 108th Cong. (2004); H.R. 2011, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 1011, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 2521, 107th
Cong. (2002); H.R. 1073, 107th Cong. (2001); H.R 860; 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 2549, 105th Cong. (1997).
S. 1011, 108th Cong. (2003).
421. See Discussion supra Part 2.E: Towards Enactment of the WEP.
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C. The Public Servant Retirement Protection Act
Among the various proposals to amend or repeal the WEP, the Public Servant
Retirement Protection Act (PSRPA) represents the only legislative effort to
introduce a proportional WEP.422 Representative Brady first introduced the bill
before the House on May 19, 2004, and a day later, Senator Hutchison introduced a
companion bill in the Senate. 423 Thereafter, Representative Brady and Senator
Hutchison have reintroduced the bill in every succeeding Congress through 2011.424
The PSRPA provides for two alternative formulas for determining a worker's
PIA. 425 Under the bill, the applicability of a particular approach to a given worker
426
turns on when the worker first commences employment in a noncovered position.
For workers first commencing employment in a noncovered position after the
twelfth calendar month following the bill's enactment, the PSRPA would substitute
a proportional formula for the current law WEP.427 If enacted, the bill would instruct
the SSA to include both covered earnings and recorded noncovered earnings in the
calculation for AIME (henceforth, this Article will use the term total AIME to
distinguish from AIME under current law).428 For purposes of the PSRPA, recorded
noncovered earnings are earnings from employment in a noncovered position for
which the Commissioner of Social Security determines satisfactory evidence is
available in the record.429 Thereafter, the bill would require the SSA to derive PIA
by applying the Social Security benefits formula, without the current law WEP, to
the worker's total AIME.43 Finally, the bill would instruct the SSA to multiply the
worker's PIA by the ratio of the worker's current law AIME to total AIME.43 The
product represents a worker's covered PIA.
For example, consider a worker who earned an annual salary of $90,000 in
Social Security covered employment for 20 years and recorded noncovered
employment for 15 years. As the PSRPA considers both types of earnings, the
worker's total AIME would be $7,500 (($90,000 * 35) / 420). Note that the
worker's total AIME equals AIME under the current law for a worker with identical
earnings stemming only from noncovered employment. Applying the Social
Security benefits formula, the worker's PIA under the bill would be $2,355.90 (.9 *
422. H.R. 2797, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 113, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 1221, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 490,
111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 2772, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1647, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1714, 109th Cong.
(2005); S. 866, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 4391, 108th Cong. (2004); S. 2455 108th Cong. (2004).
423. H.R. 4391, 108th Cong. (2004); S. 2455 108th Cong. (2004).
424. H.R. 2797, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 113, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 1221, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 490,
111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 2772, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1647, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1714, 109th Cong.
(2005); S. 866, 109th Cong. (2005).
425. H.R. 2797, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 113, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 1221, 11Ith Cong. (2009); S. 490,
11Ith Cong. (2009); H.R. 2772, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1647, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1714, 109th Cong.
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$767) + (.32 * ($4,624 - $767)) + (.15 * ($7,500 - $767)). Again, note that the
worker has obtained the same replacement rate as a worker with identical earnings
arising only from Social Security covered employment - 31 percent (($2,355.90 /
$7,500) * 100). Finally, the bill would instruct the SSA to decrease the worker's
PIA by multiplying the figure by the ratio of current law AIME to total AIME,
resulting in a covered PIA of $1,364.20 ($2,355.90 * (((20 * $90,000) / 420) /
$7,500)).
Alternatively, where an individual commenced employment in a noncovered
position during or before the 12-month period following enactment of the PSRPA,
the bill would permit the individual to take the larger of the covered PIA as
determined under the proportional WEP described above, or the PIA determined
under the current law WEP.432 Here, the combined effect of several of the bill's
provisions introduces a significant complication. If enacted, the bill would apply
retroactively, requiring the SSA to recompute benefits for all potentially effected
individuals. 433 As discussed above, the bill would require the SSA to include in total
AIME, recorded noncovered earnings arising from services performed in
noncovered employment after 1950.434 However, the SSA lacks data on earnings
arising from noncovered employment during calendar years prior to 1978.43
Beginning in 1978, the SSA collected such data through IRS Form W-2, but the
436data is often incomplete - especially from years immediately preceding 1978.
Thus, for all workers who commenced noncovered employment prior to the date of
the bill's future enactment, the proportional WEP would potentially reach back to
noncovered earnings for which the SSA lacks data.
To account for the data gap, the drafters of the PSRPA included a provision
which substitutes adjusted total covered earnings (ATCE) for total AIME.437 Where
any portion of a worker's earnings consists of nonrecorded noncovered earnings,
the PSRPA would instruct the SSA to derive ATCE by calculating the sum of
covered and recorded noncovered earnings, and dividing the figure by the number
of months elapsed during the years in which the worker earned covered and
recorded noncovered earnings.438 Thereafter, the bill would apply the Social
Security benefits formula, without the WEP, to ATCE to derive a worker's PIA.439
To arrive at covered PIA for a worker, the bill would instruct the SSA to multiply
PIA by the ratio of the worker's current law AIME to ATCE.4'
432. H.R. 2797, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 113, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 1221, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 490,
111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 2772, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1647, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1714, 109th Cong.
(2005); S. 866, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 4391, 108th Cong. (2004); S. 2455 108th Cong. (2004).
433. Id.
434. Id.
435. Fourth in a Series of Subcommittee Hearings on Protecting and Strengthening Social Security:
Hearing before the S. Comm. on Soc. Sec., 109th Cong. 18 (2005).
436. Id.
437. H.R. 2797, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 113, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 1221, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 490,
111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 2772, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1647, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1714, 109th Cong.






To illustrate application of this alternative approach, imagine a worker who
earned $90,000 annually for 20 years in covered employment, 10 years in
nonrecorded noncovered employment, and 5 years in recorded noncovered
employment. Additionally, assume that the PSRPA had passed in 2011, and that the
worker reached early retirement age in 2012. Because some of the worker's
earnings arise from nonrecorded noncovered employment, the PSRPA requires the
SSA to calculate ATCE, which, in this case, equals $7,500 (($90,000 * 25) / (25 *
12)). Next, the PSRPA applies the Social Security benefits formula to ATCE,
resulting in a PIA of $2,355.90 (($767 * .9) + (.32 * ($4,626 - $767)) + (.15 *
($7,500 - $4,624))). Finally, the PSRPA multiplies PIA by the ratio of current law
AIME to ATCE, resulting in a covered PIA, if the worker retires at full retirement
age, of $1,346.20 ($2,355.90 * ((($90,000 * 20) / 420) / $7,500). As the worker's
service in noncovered employment necessarily commenced before enactment of the
PSRPA, the final step under this approach is to determine whether the worker's
covered PIA exceeds the worker's current law PIA with the WEP, which in this
example, equal $1,624.50. As the worker's current law PIA with the WEP exceeds
covered PIA, the PSRPA would permit the worker to take $1,624.50 as her monthly
benefit.
Although the PSRPA represents the only legislative effort to introduce a
proportional WEP, support for the PSRPA has been relatively weak."' When
Representative Brady, a Republican from Texas, first introduced the bill in the
4A2
House, five cosponsors endorsed the PSRPA. Support for the bill peaked in
2005, when 24 Representatives joined Representative Brady as cosponsors of the
bill." 3 Thereafter, support for the bill has waned, falling to 15 and 16 cosponsors in
the House in 2009 and 2011 respectively 44, and reaching a low of seven cosponsors
during the 112t' Congress.445 As in the case of the SSFA, two patterns are evident
from an examination of the PSRPA's cosponsors in the House of Representatives.
First, Republicans have consistently accounted for at least two-thirds of the bill's
cosponsors.446 During recent Congresses, Republican sponsorship of the PSRPA has
risen as high as 87.5 percent in 2009, and 100 percent in 201 1.447 Similarly,
representatives from Texas - one of the seven states in which more than 70 percent
of noncovered state and local government employees are concentrated" - have
consistently provided strong backing for the PSRPA.449 In fact, representatives from
Texas constituted more than 80 percent of the bill's endorsers between 2007 and
441. H.R. 2797, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 113, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 1221, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 490,
11Ith Cong. (2009); H.R. 2772, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1647, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1714, 109th Cong.
(2005); S. 866, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 4391, 108th Cong. (2004); S. 2455 108th Cong. (2004).
442. H.R. 4391, 108th Cong (2004).
443. H.R. 1714, 109th Cong. (2005).
444. H.R. 1221, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 2772, 110th Cong. (2007).
445. H.R. 2797, 112th Cong. (2011).
446. H.R. 2797, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 1221, 11Ith Cong. (2009); H.R. 2772, 110th Cong. (2007);
H.R. 1714, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 4391, 108th Cong. (2004).
447. H.R. 2797, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 1221, 111 th Cong. (2009).
448. U.s GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 17, at 4.
449. H.R. 2797, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 1221, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 2772, 110th Cong. (2007);
H.R. 1714, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 4391, 108th Cong. (2004).
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2011.450 In the Senate, support for the bill has consistently been limited to Senator
4511
Hutchison - a Republican from Texas and the bill's sponsor. In all cases, the
House and Senate referred the bills to the House Committee on Ways and Means or
452
the Senate Committee on Finance, where the bills died in committee.
Proposing a proportional WEP, the PSRPA adopts the most equitable approach
to adjusting for noncovered employment of any of the Congressionally proposed
methods, as the bill would permit worker's with noncovered employment to receive
the same replacement rates as their counterparts who received identical earnings,
but only worked in Social Security covered employment.45 However, depending on
whether one emphasizes the earned right principle of the Social Security system or
the importance of a progressive benefit structure,454 the bill's method for achieving
proportionality represents either a strength or a weakness. To illustrate, consider
two workers, both of whom held Social Security covered employment for 20 years
receiving $50,000 annually. The first worker, in addition to his Social Security
covered employment, also earned $20,000 annually for 15 years in recorded
noncovered employment. As the PSRPA considers both types of earnings, the
worker's total AIME would be $3,095.23 ((($50,000 * 20) + ($20,000 * 15)) /
420).455 Next, under the bill, one would apply the Social Security benefits formula,
resulting in an initial PIA for the worker of $1,435.30 (.9 * $767) + (.32 *
($3,095.23 - $767)).456 Finally, the bill would instruct the SSA to multiply initial
PIA by the ratio of AIME to total AIME resulting in a covered PIA of $1,104
(($1,435.30 * ((($50,000 * 20) / 420) / $3,095.23).457
As with the example of the first worker, the second worker held recorded
noncovered employment for 15 years; however, during her period in noncovered
employment, the second worker earned $90,000 annually. Here, the second worker
458
has a total AIME of $5,595.23 ((($50,000 * 20) + ($90,000 * 15)) / 420) . If the
450. H.R. 2797, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 1221, 11Ith Cong. (2009); H.R. 2772, 110th Cong. (2007).
451. S. 113, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 490, 111 th Cong. (2009); S. 1647, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 866, 109th
Cong. (2005); S. 2455 108th Cong. (2004).
452. See generally, Bill Tracking Report, PROQUEST CONGRESSIONAL, http://web.lexis-
nexis.com.ezproxy.1ibrary.unlv.edu/congcomp (last visited Feb. 25, 2012).
453. H.R. 2797, 1l2th Cong. (2011); S. 113,1 I12th Cong. (2011); H.R. 1221, Illth Cong. (2009); S. 490,
11Ith Cong. (2009); H.R. 2772, 1l0th Cong. (2007); S. 1647, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1714, 109th Cong.
(2005); S. 866, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 4391, 108th Cong. (2004); S. 2455 108th Cong. (2004).
454. U.S Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 17, at 3; Hearing: Penalty for Public Service, supra
note 42, at 13 (statement of Jo Anne. B. Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security).
455. H.R. 2797, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 113, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 1221, 11Ith Cong. (2009); S. 490,
11Ith Cong. (2009); H.R. 2772, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1647, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1714, 109th Cong.
(2005); S. 866, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 4391, 108th Cong. (2004); S. 2455 108th Cong. (2004); 42 U.S.C.
215(a)(7); 42 U.S.C. 215(b).
456. H.R. 2797, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 113, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 1221, 11Ith Cong. (2009); S. 490,
11Ith Cong. (2009); H.R. 2772, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1647, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1714, 109th Cong.
(2005); S. 866, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 4391, 108th Cong. (2004); S. 2455 108th Cong. (2004); 42 U.S.C.
215(a)(7); 42 U.S.C. 215(a).
457. H.R. 2797, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 113, ll2th Cong. (2011); H.R. 1221, Illth Cong. (2009); S. 490,
11Ith Cong. (2009); H.R. 2772, 1 10th Cong. (2007); S. 1647, 1 10th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1714, 109th Cong.
(2005); S. 866, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 4391, 108th Cong. (2004); S. 2455 108th Cong. (2004).
458. H.R. 2797, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 113, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 1221, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 490,
11Ith Cong. (2009); H.R. 2772, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1647, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1714, 109th Cong.
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second worker reaches early retirement age in 2012 and defers retirement until full
retirement age, under the bill, the worker would have an initial PIA of $2,070.20 (.9
* $767) + (.32 * ($4,624 - $767)) + (.15 * ($5,595.23 - $4,624)).459 However, once
one multiplies the second worker's initial PIA by the ratio of AIME to total AIME,
one finds that under the bill, the second worker has a covered PIA of $844.90
(($2,070.20 * ((($50,000 * 20) / 420) / $5,833.33).460
The foregoing examples held constant the number of years each worker held
Social Security covered employment and recorded noncovered employment.
Similarly, in both examples, the workers received identical earnings while in Social
Security covered employment. While both workers contributed an equal amount to
the Social Security system over an identical length of time, under the bill, the first
worker would receive a benefit $259.10 larger than that of the second worker. The
only factor permitted to vary in the above examples was the annual salary of each
worker while in noncovered employment. Thus, one finds that under the bill, as
earnings increase in noncovered employment, the decrease in PIA also increases.
For those who emphasize the progressive nature of the Social Security benefits
4611formula, this result is likely desirable. After all, when compared to the first
worker who received an average annual salary of $37,142.86, the second worker is
a high-earner who enjoyed an average annual salary of $67,142.86. Moreover, the
second worker's service in noncovered employment affords her an additional
pension on which she can rely in her retirement. On the other hand, the earned right
principle of Social Security benefits also represents a fundamental tenet of the
Social Security system - that is, a worker receives an entitlement to benefits based
462on contributions. In this context, one can question the equity of permitting
noncovered earnings to influence the Social Security benefits of workers who held
463noncovered employment. FICA taxes apply to all remuneration for employment.
Thus, a worker does not contribute to the Social Security system where she receives
other types of income, including inheritances, lottery jackpots, and treasure
troves.46 Such income can transform a life-long low-income worker into a high-
income retiree overnight, yet the Social Security benefits formula does not account
for unearned income.465 Why should the Social Security benefits formula treat
income stemming from noncovered employment differently?
(2005); S. 866, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 4391, 108th Cong. (2004); S. 2455 108th Cong. (2004); 42 U.S.C.
215(a)(7); 42 U.S.C. 215(b).
459. H.R. 2797, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 113, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 1221, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 490,
11Ith Cong. (2009); H.R. 2772, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1647, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1714, 109th Cong.
(2005); S. 866, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 4391, 108th Cong. (2004); S. 2455 108th Cong. (2004); 42 U.S.C.
215(a)(7); 42 U.S.C. 215(a).
460. H.R. 2797, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 113, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 1221, 11Ith Cong. (2009); S. 490,
111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 2772, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1647, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1714, 109th Cong.
(2005); S. 866, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 4391, 108th Cong. (2004); S. 2455 108th Cong. (2004).
461. U.S Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 17, at 3.
462. Hearing: Penalty for Public Service, supra note 42, at 13 (statement of Jo Anne. B. Barnhart,
Commissioner of Social Security).
463. 26 U.S.C. § 3101(a) (2010); 26 U.S.C. § 3121(a) (2008).
464. 26 U.S.C. § 3101(a); 26 U.S.C. § 3121(a); 26 U.S.C. § 61(a) (1984); Cesarini v. United States, 428
F.2d 812 (6th Cir. 1970).
465. 42 U.S.C. § 415 (2006).
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Beyond policy considerations, an inherent disadvantage exists in the PSRPA's
reliance on recorded noncovered earnings - the SSA lacks data on noncovered
earnings arising prior to 1978.466 The bill does provide for an alternative calculation
where some portion of a worker's earnings stems from nonrecorded noncovered
employment.467 However, the bill provides a guarantee that such a worker may take
the larger of covered PIA as determined under the PSRPA, or PIA as determined
461
under the current law WEP. Consequently, if enacted, the bill would maintain the
disproportionate impact of the WEP. As the bill permits a retiree with
nonrecorded noncovered earnings to take the greater of covered PIA under the
411
PSRPA or PIA under the current law WEP, only those workers who receive a
higher than statutorily intended replacement rate under the WEP - high-income
worker - will have an incentive to avail themselves of the option. The above
hypothetical provided an example of a high-income worker for whom the
disproportionately high replacement rate of the WEP provided a more attractive
option. Thus, the bill does not immediately respond to the problem in the WEP that
both motivated its enactment and the calls for its repeal.47 1 If enacted, the bill would
phase-out the problem, as the option of choosing between the PSRPA calculation
and the WEP calculation would only be available to workers who commenced
noncovered employment during or before the 12-month period following the bill's
472
enactment. However, if enacted the earliest calendar year in which the PSRPA
could no longer reach back to nonrecorded noncovered earnings would be 2024, as
the SSA first began receiving a complete data set on noncovered earnings in
1983.473
Similar to the WEPRA, the PSRPA does not include a provision to implement
a system through which the SSA can verify whether state and local government
retirees are receiving a noncovered pension.474 Presently, the SSA employs data
obtained from the Office of Personnel Management to determine whether federal
retirees are receiving noncovered pensions through the Civil Service Retirement
466. See Discussion supra Part 3: WEP: The Problems.
467. H.R. 2797, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 113, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 1221, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 490,
111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 2772, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1647, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1714, 109th Cong.
(2005); S. 866, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 4391, 108th Cong. (2004); S. 2455 108th Cong. (2004).
468. Id.
469. See Discussion supra Part 3: WEP: The Problems.
470. H.R. 2797, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 113, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 1221, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 490,
11Ith Cong. (2009); H.R. 2772, 1 10th Cong. (2007); S. 1647, 1 10th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1714, 109th Cong.
(2005); S. 866, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 4391, 108th Cong. (2004); S. 2455 108th Cong. (2004).
471. See Discussion supra Parts 2.E Towards Enactment of the WEP, 3: WEP: The Problems.
472. H.R. 2797, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 113, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 1221, 11Ith Cong. (2009); S. 490,
11Ith Cong. (2009); H.R. 2772, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1647, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1714, 109th Cong.
(2005); S. 866, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 4391, 108th Cong. (2004); S. 2455 108th Cong. (2004).
473. 42 U.S.C. § 415(b)(1)(A), (b)(2)(A)(i), (b)(2)(B)(i), (b)(3)(A) (2006); Fourth in a Series of
Subcommittee Hearings on Protecting and Strengthening Social Security: Hearing before the S. Comm. on
Soc. Sec., 109th Cong. 23 (2005).
474. H.R. 2797, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 113, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 1221, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 490,
11Ith Cong. (2009); H.R. 2772, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1647, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1714, 109th Cong.
(2005); S. 866, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 4391, 108th Cong. (2004); S. 2455 108th Cong. (2004).
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System. 475 By failing to provide for a similar system for state and local government
retirees, the PSRPA would permit state and local government retirees to escape
476application of the proportional WEP to a greater extent than federal employees.
One advantage of the PSRPA is its relatively low cost. In 2007, the SSA
estimated that a similar proposal would have cost approximately $4.6 billion over
10 years, and in the long-term, would have increased the long-range deficit by
roughly .5%.477 While the PSRPA imposes a relatively small cost on the Social
Security system, the administrative burden would be significant if Congress enacts
the bill. If enacted, the bill would apply retroactively, requiring the SSA to
478recompute benefits for all potentially effected individuals. In a 2005
Congressional hearing, a Deputy Director of the SSA stated that gathering the
necessary data to administer the PSRPA and to recompute benefits for every
potentially effected worker would require approximately 2,200 work-years over a
five-year period.479
V. RECOMMENDATION
Congress enacted the WEP as part of the Social Security Amendments Act of
1983 to address the problem of 'windfall' benefits accruing to workers who receive
pensions from noncovered employment in addition to Social Security benefits.480
Although, at the time, Congress considered employing a proportional WEP to
downward adjust worker benefits in proportion to earnings in Social Security
covered employment, Congress determined that acquiring data on noncovered
4811
earnings posed insurmountable obstacles. Instead, Congress elected to substitute
40 percent for the percentage factor traditionally applicable to the first bracket of
AIME.482 An imprecise mechanism resulting from Congressional compromise, the
WEP has numerous disadvantages including a disproportionate impact on low-
income workers.483 Over the last decade and a half, Congress has attempted to
modify, repeal, or replace the WEP to no avail.484 Of the bills introduced before
Congress, the PSRPA represents the most equitable effort to date, as the bill would
provide workers with pensions from noncovered employment who also qualify for
Social Security benefits with a replacement rate equal to the replacement rate of
workers who earned an identical average annual salary, but only worked in Social
475. U.S GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 17, at 5-6 (2007).
476. See Discussion supra Part 3: WEP: The Problems.
477. ALLISON M. SHELTON, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE., 98-35, SOCIAL SECURITY: THE WINDFALL
ELIMINATION PROVISION (WEP). (2010).
478. Id.
479. Fourth in a Series of Subcommittee Hearings on Protecting and Strengthening Social Security:
Hearing before the S. Comm. on Soc. Sec., 109th Cong. 18 (2005).
480. See Discussion supra Part 2.E: Towards Enactment of the WEP.
481. John A. Svahn & Mary Ross, Social Security Amendments of 1983: Legislative History and Summary
of Provisions, 46 SoC. SECURITY BULL. 10 (1983).
482. H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 98-47, at 120-121 (1983).
483. See Discussion supra Part 3: WEP: The Problems; See also, Brown & Weisbenner, supra note 21, at
8-13.
484. See Discussion supra Part 4: Legislative Action.
238 [Vol. 39:2
An Equitable Approach to Addressing 'Windfall' Benefits
Security covered employment. 485 However, by considering total earnings in both
covered and noncovered employment, the bill undermines the earned right principle
of the Social Security system by permitting noncovered earnings to influence a
worker's PIA.486 By adopting a provision that adjusts the bendpoints in proportion
to the number of years a worker held covered employment, Congress can achieve
the same equitable result, without permitting noncovered earnings to influence PIA.
The problem of 'windfall benefits' arises by operation of the calculation for
AIME, which averages the sum of a worker's 35 highest earnings years in Social
Security covered employment over a 35-year period.487 However, the 'windfall
benefits' problem actually implicates a second component of the Social Security
benefits formula's structure - specifically, the bendpoints that delineate the brackets
of AIME to which the progressive percentage factors apply. In 2012, the first and
second bendpoints are $767 and $4,624 respectively,488 creating three brackets of
AIME: (1) $0 to $767, (2) $768 to $4,624, and (3) $4,625 to the level of AIME
489
representing maximum taxable earnings ($8,199 in 2012). Conceptually, one can
think of the bendpoints as defining, within each bracket, both the contributions a
worker must make to the Social Security system over 35 years and the benefits
available to a worker based on 35 years of contributions. Thus, for example, to
receive the maximum benefit available within the first bracket of AIME ($690.30 in
2012), a worker reaching early retirement age in 2012 must earn $322,140 ($767 *
420) during 35 of the 40 years preceding 2012.490 Holding the present FICA
employee tax rate constant (6.2 percent),49' the worker must contribute $19,972.68
($322,140 * .062) to the Social Security system to receive the maximum benefit
available within the first bracket of AIME. As such, one can perceive how the
interplay of the calculation for AIME, and the structure of the Social Security
benefits formula create the 'windfall' benefits problem. Specifically, the averaging
provision compresses AIME for workers who held noncovered employment 49 2
while the bendpoints continue to delineate the brackets of AIME as if the worker
held Social Security employment for 35 years. Each bracket considers too high of a
level of AIME (or, conversely, too large of a contribution to the Social Security
system) permitting a worker who held less than 35 years of Social Security covered
employment to receive too high of a benefit within each bracket.
485. See Discussion supra Parts 4.C: Public Servant Retirement Protection Act or 3.A.I1l: Comparison
with a Proportional WEP; H.R. 2797, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 113, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 1221, 11Ith
Cong. (2009); S. 490, 11 Ith Cong. (2009); H.R. 2772, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1647, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R.
1714, 109th Cong. (2005); S. 866, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 4391, 108th Cong. (2004); S. 2455 108th Cong.
(2004).
486. See Discussion supra Part 4.C: Public Servant Retirement Protection Act.
487. See Discussion supra Part 2.D: Effect of Noncovered Employment under the Social Security Benefits
Formula. 42 U.S.C. § 415(b)(1), (b)(1)(A), (b)(2)(A)(i), (b)(2)(B)(i) (2006).
488. 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(B)(i); Cost-of-Living Increase and Other Determinations for 2012, 76 Fed. Reg.
66,111, 66,115 (Oct. 25, 2011).
489. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(1)(A)(i), (ii).
490. 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(B)(i), (b)(1), (b)(1)(A), (b)(2)(A)(i), (b)(2)(B)(i); Cost-of-Living Increase and
Other Determinations for 2012, 76 Fed. Reg. 66,111, 66,115 (Oct. 25, 2011).
491. 26U.S.C§3101(a)(2010);26U.S.C.§3111(a)(2011).




As soon as one recognizes that the bendpoints essentially define the
contributions required of, and benefits available to a worker who held Social
Security covered employment for 35 years, a solution to the problem of 'windfall
benefits' becomes readily apparent. One must merely multiply each bendpoint by
the ratio of years worked in Social Security covered employment to the number of
years over which the calculation for AIME averages earnings (35 years). These
calculations downward adjust the three brackets in proportion to the number of
years worked in Social Security covered employment. Thereafter, one can apply the
ordinary Social Security benefits formula, substituting the proportional bendpoints
for the bendpoints applicable to a worker who held 35 years of Social Security
covered employment.
As a benchmark, consider a worker who reaches early retirement age in 2012
after working in Social Security covered employment for 35 years, earning an
annual salary of $75,000. Here, the worker has a full record in Social Security
covered employment for purposes of calculating AIME, which, in this example,
equals $6,250 (($75,000 * 35) / 420).493 If the worker defers retirement until full
retirement age, the worker will receive a PIA of $2,168.40 ((.9 * 767) + (.32 *
($4,624 - $767)) + (.15 * ($6,250 - $4,624))).494 Thus, the Social Security benefits
formula would provide this worker with a replacement rate of 35 percent
($2,168.40 / $6,250).
Next, consider a worker who earned an identical salary, but held Social
Security covered employment for 20 years and noncovered employment for lB
years. By averaging the worker's covered earnings over a period of 35 years, the
Social Security Act's averaging provision produces a compressed AIME of
$3,571.40 (($75,000 * 20) / 420) for this worker.495 As the worker held less than 35
years of Social Security covered employment, the next step would require adjusting
the bendpoints to reflect the number of years the worker held covered employment.
By multiplying each bendpoint by the ratio of years in covered employment to 35
years, one finds that the first and second bendpoints are $438 and $2,642
respectively (($767 * (20/35)) and ($4,624 * (20/35)).496 By substituting the
proportional bendpoints into the ordinary Social Security benefits formula, one
finds that if the worker defers retirement until full retirement age, she would receive
a PIA of $1,053.50 ((.9 * $438) + (.32 * ($2,642 - $438)) + (.15 * ($3,571.40 -
$2,642))) under the alternative formula.497 Note that the worker in the second
example receives the exact same replacement rate - 35 percent ($1,053.50 /
$3,035.70) - as the worker from the first example who earned an identical annual
salary and only held Social Security covered employment. Thus, the foregoing
examples demonstrate that by adjusting the bendpoints such that the benefits
available within each bracket of AIME are proportional to the number of years a
493. 42 U.S.C. § 415(b).
494. 42 U.S.C. § 415(a).
495. 42 U.S.C. § 415(b).
496. 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(B)(i); Cost-of-Living Increase and Other Determinations for 2012, 76 Fed. Reg.
66,111, 66,115 (Oct. 25, 2011).
497. 42 U.S.C. § 415(a).
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worker held Social Security covered employment, the SSA can provide a worker
who held noncovered employment a replacement rate that is identical to the
replacement rate of a worker who only worked in covered employment and
498
received identical average annual earnings.
The issue of whether the PSRPA or the proportional bendpoints approach
presents the superior method of addressing the 'windfall benefits' problem presents
a difficult policy question - should a modified WEP emphasize the progressivity of
benefits or the earned right tenet of Social Security benefits. By decreasing benefits
as earnings outside of the Social Security system increase, the PSRPA embodies the
principle of progressivity, as workers with significant noncovered earnings will
appear to be high-earners relative to workers who received less in noncovered
499
employment, but earned an identical annual salary in covered employment.
However, inclusion of noncovered earnings in the Social Security benefits formula
permits a factor other than contributions to influence a worker's potential benefit.soo
The proportional bendpoints approach would ignore noncovered earnings,
achieving progressivity to the extent that the calculation considers covered
earnings. Thus, the approach emphasizes the earned right principle of benefits - a
worker receives a benefit based only on contributions. However, there is another
manner in which one can consider the problem - the two principles do not operate
in isolation, but rather are interconnected. The Social Security benefits formula
looks to total earnings in Social Security covered employment, representing total
contributions, and provides a progressive benefit based on the need demonstrated
by a worker's earning level. The proportional bendpoints approach accomplishes
exactly this task for the period a worker held covered employment, while permitting
the noncovered pension system into which a worker contributed to accomplish the
task for the period of noncovered employment. By contrast, the PSRPA would, at
least in part, duplicate the function of the noncovered pension.
However, the issue of which approach to calculating benefits for workers who
held noncovered employment presents the superior option does not turn on the
policy question alone, as there are many advantages to the proportional bendpoints
approach. For example, by only considering earnings deriving from Social Security
498. .Note that the Social Security Act would treat a worker who, for example, held Social Security
covered employment for 20 years, and then retired, more favorably. For an individual to be subject to the
current law WEP, she must qualify for a noncovered pension after 1985. 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(7)(A)(ii). In this
example, the individual's employment record would not trigger the WEP, as the individual did not hold
noncovered employment, she simply retired. Thus, the SSA would enter 15 zero years into the calculation for
AIME, divide by 420 months, and apply the Social Security benefits formula. 42 U.S.C. § 415(a), (b). As a
result, 'windfall' benefits will accrue to an individual with this type of employment record. See infra, Effect
of Noncovered Employment under the Social Security Benefits Formula. Whether the individual's situation
truly compares to that of a noncovered worker who qualifies for a noncovered pension is debatable. On one
hand, the individual will not have the benefit of a noncovered pension in addition to his Social Security
benefits. On the other, the individual may have retired after winning the lottery. In the context of broader
Social Security reform, the SSA can apply the proportional benefits approach to calculating Social Security
benefits for all workers. By applying the approach broadly, the SSA can address 'windfall' benefits that
accrue to individuals with the type of employment history described above. The potential benefits and social
costs of broad application of this method, however, exceed the scope of this Article.




covered employment, the proportional bendpoints approach avoids issues arising
under the PSRPA relating to data on noncovered earnings. The SSA entirely lacks
data on noncovered earnings arising from noncovered employment prior to 1978,
and has incomplete information on such earnings arising between 1978 and 1983,'o'
the PRSPA must turn to an alternative approach to calculating benefits for workers
102
with nonrecorded noncovered earnings. The alternative approach permits a
worker with nonrecorded noncovered earnings to take the larger of PIA under the
current law WEP or PIA as determined through a calculation that includes ATCE."'
Thus, this approach both preserves the disproportionate impact of the WEP, and
potentially introduces new issues through the ATCE calculation.5 04 The proportional
bendpoints approach entirely avoids these issues by eliminating the current law
WEP, focusing on covered earnings, and creating a single calculation applicable to
all workers who receive a pension from noncovered employment.
If the SSA improves the methods by which it communicates with the public
regarding the purpose of the WEP, a proportional bendpoints approach to the
problem of 'windfall benefits' has a strong potential to allay public misperceptions
and resentment towards the WEP. As demonstrated throughout this Article, the
Social Security benefits formula is a highly complex, and involved calculation to
which the WEP adds a layer of complexity."' Understanding the purpose of the
WEP requires knowledge of the policy behind the Social Security system, and
likely, examples of the effect of noncovered employment on PIA under the ordinary
Social Security benefits formula. While the proportional bendpoints approach
adds an additional calculation to the formula, it removes much of the WEP's
complexity and arbitrariness. The approach does not rely on an imprecise
percentage factor that was determined through Congressional compromise." Nor
does the method vary the applicable percentage factors based on the number of
years a worker held Social Security covered employment." Moreover, one does not
need to understand the policy implications of 'windfall benefits' to recognize the
equity of setting PIA in proportion to the number of years during which a worker
contributed to the Social Security system. The PSRPA accomplishes a similar task,
albeit through a different mechanism. 09 However, by permitting noncovered
501. Fourth in a Series of Subcommittee Hearings on Protecting and Strengthening Social Security:
Hearing before the S. Comm. on Soc. Sec., 109th Cong. 18, 23 (2005).
502. H.R. 2797, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 113, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 1221, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 490,
11Ith Cong. (2009); H.R. 2772, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1647, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1714, 109th Cong.
(2005); S. 866, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 4391, 108th Cong. (2004); S. 2455 108th Cong. (2004)..
503. Id.
504. See Discussion supra Parts 3: WEP: The Problems, 4.C: The Public Servant Retirement Protection
Act.
505. See Discussion supra Parts 3.C: Public Misperception and Resentment: SSA Efforts to Educate the
Public.
506. See Discussion supra Parts 2.C: The Social Security Benefits Formula, 2.D Effect of Noncovered
Employment under the Social Security Benefits Formula.
507. See infra, Enactment of the WEP; 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(7)(B)(ii)(V) (2006).
508. 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(7)(D).
509. H.R. 2797, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 113, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 1221, 111th Cong. (2009); S. 490,
111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 2772, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1647, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1714, 109th Cong.
(2005); S. 866, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 4391, 108th Cong. (2004); S. 2455 108th Cong. (2004).
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earnings to influence PIA, the PSRPA is likely to preserve concerns among the
public that the provision penalizes government employees for electing to work in
the public sector."'o
Although a proportional bendpoints approach to the 'windfall benefits' problem
alleviates concerns regarding the disproportionate impact of the WEP, the modified
calculation does not address shortcomings in the SSA's ability to gather data on
state and local government employees receiving noncovered pensions. Presently,
the SSA periodically cross-references beneficiary records with data from the Office
of Personnel Management to verify whether federal government retirees are
receiving noncovered pensions."' As the SSA only employs a post-entitlement
matching procedure for federal retirees, the SSA enforces the WEP against federal
government retirees to a greater degree than against state and local government
retirees.512 Accordingly, along with adopting a proportional bendpoints approach,
Congress should include a provision permitting the SSA to gather data through
Form 1099R on state and local government employees receiving noncovered
pensions.
Thus, substituting proportional bendpoints into the Social Security benefits
formula for workers who held noncovered employment, thereby earning a
noncovered pension, is a superior option. The approach balances the progressivity
of the Social Security benefits formula with earned rights inherent in Social
Security benefits. Moreover, the approach eliminates the need for the SSA to gather
data on noncovered earnings or to rely on alternative calculations, including the
current law WEP, for workers with nonrecorded noncovered earnings. Coupled
with improved efforts to communicate the need for an alternative calculation from
the SSA, the proportional bendpoints method has a strong probability of reducing
public misperceptions and resentment towards the WEP. Finally, a bill which
adopts the proportional bendpoints approach must also include a provision
permitting the SSA to collect data through Form 1099R on state and local
government employees receiving public pensions to ensure equal application (see
Appendix for a draft bill).
VI. CONCLUSION
Congress enacted the WEP to address the 'windfall' benefits that accrue to
workers who held both covered and noncovered employment.s' A product of
Congressional compromise, the WEP is an imprecise mechanism that has
significant disadvantages.Sl 4 For example, the provision disproportionately impacts
low-income workers.' 5 This disproportionate impact arises by operation of the
WEP's regressive structure and its phase-in provision, for which a high-income
510. Id.; See Discussion supra Part 3: WEP: The Problems.
511. U.S Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 17, at 5-6 (2007).
512. Id. at 6.
513. See Discussion supra Part 2.E: Towards Enactment of the WEP.
514. Id.
515. Brown & Weisbenner, supra note 21, at 8-13.
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worker is far more likely to qualify, thereby receiving a significant benefit
increase."' Moreover, the provision neither replicates the replacement rates of the
Social Security benefits formula, nor tracks the formula's progressive structure.
Administratively, the provision is difficult to enforce.5  The SSA periodically
cross-references beneficiary records with data from the Office of Personnel
Management to verify whether federal government retirees are receiving
noncovered pensions.519 As the SSA only employs a post-entitlement matching
procedure for federal retirees, a disparity presently exists in the degree to which the
SSA enforces the WEP against federal retirees, as compared to state and local
retirees. 520 Finally, considerable public misperception and resentment surrounds the
WEP.521 Moreover, instances frequently arise in which retirees suffer significant
hardship after having failed to include the effects of the WEP in their retirement
52
plans. In planning for retirement, individuals must educate themselves about the
operation of the Social Security benefits formula, the impact of decisions including
when to retire, and whether provisions such as the WEP are applicable. 523 Given the
instances of personal hardship, as well as the public misperception and resentment
surrounding the provision, one finds that the SSA is not effectively educating the
524
public about a very complex provision.
Not surprisingly, the WEP has been the subject of considerable legislative
attention since the provision's enactment in 1983.52 Senators and Representatives
have introduced more than 35 bills before Congress to modify, replace, or repeal
the WEP represent 4 distinct legislative proposals: (1) the SSFA,52 (2), the WEPRA
(2004 and later);S27 (3) the WEPRA (pre-2004),52 and (4) the PSRPA.52 This
516. See Discussion supra Part 3.A.I: The WEP's Regressive Nature, 3.A.II: Disproportionate Effect of
the Substantial Earnings Test.
517. See Discussion supra Part 3.A.III: Comparison with a Proportional WEP,
518. See Discussion supra Part 3.B: The SSA Has Insufficient Information to Apply the WEP to All of the
Targeted Beneficiaries.
519. U.S Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 17, at 5-6.
520. U.S Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 17, at 6.
521. See Discussion supra Part 3.C: Public Misperception and Resentment: SSA Efforts to Educate the
Public
522. Id.
523. Jennie L. Phipps, 7 Little-Known Social Security Benefits, BANKRATE.COM,
http://www.bankrate.com/finance/retirement/7-social-security-benefits.aspx?ecjd=ml 078090#slide=l (last
visited Mar. 9, 2012).
524. See Discussion supra Part 3.C: Public Misperception and Resentment: SSA Efforts to Educate the
Public.
525. See Discussion supra Part 4: Legislative Action.
526. H.R. 1332, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 2010, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 235, 11Ith Cong. (2009); S. 484,
111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 82, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 206, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 147, 109th Cong. (2005);
S. 619, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 594, 108 Cong. (2003); S. 349, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 2638, 107th
Cong. (2001); S. 1523, 107th Cong. (2001).
527. H.R. 2145, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 726, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1690, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R.
4234, 108th Cong. (2004).
528. H.R. 2011, 108th Cong. (2003); S. 1011, 108th Cong. (2003); H.R. 1073, 107th Cong. (2001); S.
2521, 107th Cong. (2002); H.R. 860, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 2549, 105th Cong. (1997).
529. H.R. 2797, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 113, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 1221, 11Ith Cong. (2009); S. 490,
11Ith Cong. (2009); H.R. 2772, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1647, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1714, 109th Cong.
(2005); S. 866, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 4391, 108th Cong. (2004); S. 2455, 108th Cong. (2004).
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Article"s analysis of the bills' demonstrates that the bill's either preserve the
disadvantages of the WEP, or introduce entirely new problems and inequities.3
To begin, the SSFA, by repealing the WEP, would eliminate all of the
disadvantages of the WEP if enacted. However, the bill would permit 'windfall'
benefits to accrue to worker's who held both covered and noncovered employment,
raising questions of equity as to individuals who worked in Social Security covered
132employment for 35 years.
Similarly, by restricting application of the WEP to workers whose combined
covered and noncovered pensions exceed a certain dollar threshold, both versions of
the WEPRA would eliminate many of the disadvantages of the WEP for certain
workers." However, the provision would permit 'windfall' benefits to accrue to
these workers.534 Moreover, under the WEPRA, whether 'windfall' benefits will
accrue to workers is highly dependent on the size of the worker's noncovered
government pension."' While this approach emphasizes the progressive nature of
the Social Security benefits formula, it will not always have its intended result - for
example, where a worker is entitled to significant Social Security benefits, but
receives a small noncovered pension.1' Additionally, the bill fails to address the
SSA's inability to gather data on state and local government employees receiving
noncovered pensions.3
Finally, by implementing a proportional WEP, the PSRPA would eliminate the
WEP's disproportionate impact on low-income workers. However, by permitting
benefits to decrease as earnings in noncovered employment increase, the PSRPA
raises a difficult policy question - whether a solution to the 'windfall' benefits
problem should emphasize the progressivity of benefits or the earned rights
underlying Social Security benefits."' Moreover, the SSA does not have complete
records on noncovered employment.s1o Consequently, the PSRPA must rely on a
second approach to calculating benefits for workers with nonrecorded noncovered
earnings.5 4 ' As this approach includes the current law WEP, the PSRPA would
preserve the disadvantages of the WEP for many workers.5 42 Finally, the PSRPA
does not include a provision permitting the SSA to gather data through IRS Form
543
1099R on workers receiving state and local government noncovered pensions.
530. See Discussion supra Part 4: Legislative Action.
531. See Discussion supra Part 4.A: The Social Security Fairness Act.
532. Id.













The proportional bendpoints approach presented in this Article provides the
superior option to addressing the problem of 'windfall' benefits accruing to
noncovered workers.m By merely multiplying each bendpoint by the ratio of years
worked in Social Security covered employment to the number of years over which
the calculation for AIME averages earnings (35 years), one can adjust the three
brackets of AIME, such that the benefits available from each bracket are
proportional to the number of years worked in Social Security covered
employment.5 45 This method ensures equitable benefits to public servants by
balancing the progressivity of the Social Security benefits formula with the earned
right principle of Social Security benefits.546
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APPENDIX
A BILL
To amend Title II of the Social Security Act to repeal the Windfall Elimination
Provision and ensure equitable benefits for public servants.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States
ofAmerica in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act May be cited as the "Equitable Benefits for Public Servants Act of
2013"
SECTION 2. REPEAL OF CURRENT WINDFALL ELIMINATION PROVISION
"Paragraph (7) of section 215(a) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C.
415(a)(7) is repealed."'
SECTION 3. REPLACEMENT OF THE WINDFALL ELIMINATION
PROVISION WITH A FORMULA PROVIDING A PROPORTIONAL BENEFIT
BASED ON CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM FOR
CERTAIN INDIVUDALS WITH NONCOVERED EMPLOYMENT
(a) SUBSTITUTION OF PROPORTIONAL BENDPOINTS FOR THE AMOUNT
ESTABLISHED FOR PURPOSES OF CLAUSE (I) AND (II) OF SUBPARAGRAPH (A) OF
PARAGRAPH (1).
"(1)IN GENERAL. - Section 215(a) of the Social Security Act (as amended by
section 2 of this act) is amended further by inserting after paragraph (6) the
following new paragraph:""
"(7)(A) In the case of an individual whose primary insurance amount would be
computed under paragraph (1) of this subsection, who-
(i) attains age 62 after 1985 (except where he or she became entitled to a
disability insurance benefit before 1986 and remained so entitled in any
of the 12 months immediately preceding his or her attainment of age 62),
or
(ii) would attain age 62 after 1985 and becomes eligible for a disability
insurance benefit after 1985,And who first becomes eligible after 1985
for a monthly periodic payment (including a payment determined under
subparagraph (C), but excluding (I) a payment under the Railroad
Retirement Act of 1974 or '937 [45 U.S.C.A. §§ 231 et seq., 228a et
seq.], (II) a payment by a social security system of a foreign country
based on an agreement concluded between the United States and such
foreign country pursuant to section 433 of this title, and (III) a payment
based wholly on service as a member of a uniformed service (As defined
in section 410(m) of this title) which is based in whole or in part upon
his or her earnings for service which did not constitute employment as
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defined in section 410 of this title for purposes of this subchapter
(hereafter in this paragraph and in subsection (d)(3) of this section
referred to as "noncovered service"), the primary insurance amount of
that individual during his or her concurrent entitlement to such monthly
periodic payment and to old-age or disability insurance benefits shall be
computed or recomputed under subparagraph (B).""'
"(B)(i) If paragraph (1) of this subsection would apply to such an individual
(Except for subparagraph (A) of this paragraph), there shall be computed an
amount equal to the individual's primary insurance amount under paragraph
(1) of this subsection, except that for purposes of such computation"" "the
amount established for purposes of clause (i) and (ii) of subparagraph (A) of
paragraph (1) shall equal"v
(ii) "for individuals who initially become eligible for old-age or disability
insurance benefits, or who die (before becoming eligible for such
benefits), in the calendar year 1979,"" the product of the corresponding
amount established under subparagraph (B)(i) of paragraph (1) and the
quotient obtained by dividing
(I) the number of years during which the individual held covered
employment; by
(II) 35 years
"Each amount so established shall be rounded to the nearest $1, except that
any amount so established which is a multiple of $0.50 but not of $1 shall be
rounded to the next higher $1."""
(iii) "for individuals who initially become eligible for old-age or disability
insurance benefits, or who die (before becoming eligible for such
benefits), in any calendar year after 1979,"v" the product of the
corresponding amount established under clause (ii)(I)-(II) of
subparagraph (B) of paragraph (1) and the quotient obtained by dividing
(1) the number of years during which the individual held covered
employment; by
(II) 35 years
"Each amount so established shall be rounded to the nearest $1, except that
any amount so established which is a multiple of $0.50 but not of $1 shall be
rounded to the next higher $1 ."x
(C) "This paragraph shall not apply in the case of an individual whose eligibility for
old-age or disability insurance benefits is based on an agreement concluded pursuant to
section 433 of this title or an individual who on January 1, 1984-
(i) is an employee performing service to which social security coverage is
extended on that date solely by reason of the amendments made by section
101 of the Social Security Amendments of 1983, or
(ii) is an employee of a nonprofit organization which (on December 31, 1983)
did not have in effect a waiver certificate under section 3121(k) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 and to the employees of which social security coverage
is extended on that date solely by reason of the amendments made by section
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102 of that Act, unless social security coverage had previously extended to
service performed by such individual as an employee of that organization
under a waiver certificate which was subsequently (prior to December 31,
1983) terminated."x
SECTION 3. "INFORMATION FOR ADMINISTRATION OF SOCIAL
SECURITY PROVISIONS RELATED TO NONCOVERED EMPLOYMENT
(a) Collection. - Subsection (d) of section 6047 of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986 is amended by redesignating paragraph (2) as paragraph (3) and by inserting
after paragraph (1) the following new paragraph:
(2) DEFERRED COMPENSATION PLANS OF A STATE.-
(A) IN GERERAL. - In the case of an employer deferred compensation plan (as
defined in section 3405(e)(5) of a State, a political subdivision thereof, or any
agency or instrumentality of any of the foregoing, the Secretary shall in such
forms or regulations require, to the extent such information is known or should
be known, the identification of any designated distribution (as defined in
section 3405(e)(1)) if paid to any participant or beneficiary of such plan based
in whole or in part upon an individual's earnings for service in the employ of
any such governmental entity.
(B) STATE - For purpose of subparagraph (A), the term 'State' includes the
District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands,
Guam, and American Samoa.
(b) Disclosure. - Paragraph (1) of section 6103(1) of such Code is amended by
striking 'and' at the end of subparagraph (B), by striking the period at the end
of subparagraph (C) and inserting ';and', and by adding at the end the
following:
(D) any designated distribution described in section 6047(d)(2) to the Social
Security Administration for purposes of its administration of the Social
Security Act.'.,"'
SEC. 4. EFFECTIVE DATE
"The amendment made by sections (2) and (3) of this Act shall apply with
respect to monthly insurance benefits for months commencing with or after the 12
calendar month following the date of the enactment of this Act. Notwithstanding
section 215(f) of the Social Security Act, the Commissioner of Social Security shall
recompute primary insurance amounts to the extent necessary to carry out the
amendments made by this Act."'x
i H.R. 2797, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 113, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 1221, 11Ith Cong. (2009); S. 490,
111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 2772, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1647, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1714, 109th Cong.
(2005); S. 866, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 4391, 108th Cong. (2004); S. 2455 108th Cong. (2004). (Useful
formatting language)
ii Id. (Useful formatting language)
iii 42 U.S.C. 415(a)(7)(A) (original language of the Windfall Elimination Provision
iv 42 U.S.C. 415(a)(7)(B)(i) (original language of the Windfall Elimination Provision)
v 42 U.S.C. 415(a)(B)(i)(original language of the Social Security Act)
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vi Id.
vii 42 U.S.C. 415(a)(1)(A)(Original language of the Social Security Act).
viii 42 U.S.C. 415(a)(B)(ii)(original language of the Social Security Act)
ix 42 U.S.C. 415(a)(1)(A)(Original language of the Social Security Act).
x 42 U.S.C. 415(a)(7)(E)(i), (ii) (Original language of the Windfall Elimination Provision)
xi H.R. 3630, 112th Cong. (2011) (language included in H.R. 3630. H.R. 3630 passed on Feb. 12,
2012; however, as enacted, the legislation did not include the IRS Form 1099R provision). Middle Class Tax
Relief and Job Creation Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-96, 126 Stat. 156
xii H.R. 2797, 112th Cong. (2011); S. 113, 112th Cong. (2011); H.R. 1221, 11Ith Cong. (2009); S. 490,
111th Cong. (2009); H.R. 2772, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1647, 110th Cong. (2007); H.R. 1714, 109th Cong.
(2005); S. 866, 109th Cong. (2005); H.R. 4391, 108th Cong. (2004); S. 2455 108th Cong. (2004). (Useful
formatting language)
